THE CRUCIAL ROLE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

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Third-party interventions into ongoing civil wars are complex attempts to manipulate the preferences of warring parties, and thus conflict outcomes. These attempts to alter the course of a conflict can include providing materiel, intelligence, and money to change the structure of the relationship among combatants, or alternatively, providing information through mediation and other diplomatic initiatives to change the information that they hold about their adversary. Both approaches can have conflict management goals, although mediation has a much more direct link to a goal of containing violence and making peace. Conceptually, however, the two approaches to intervention could work in unison.

2.1.1 Information, Structural Change, and External Intervention

External actors operate in a hostile environment where information asymmetries about relative capabilities and preferences matter, and some form of a security dilemma exists. In this respect, any potentially successful intervention has to manipulate the structure of the relationship between the warring parties and the information they have about the other's preferences and capabilities. For the most part, military or economic interventions only manipulate the former, and possibly help to confuse the latter. Empirical studies of civil war interventions generally focus on manipulating structures.

The structure of the relationship between the warring parties can be manipulated through outside interventions by 1) changing the incentives for fighting or the military and economic ability to fight, and by 2) preventing or minimizing accidental flare-ups (Fortna, 2004). Manipulating information may, however, influence calculations about when and how to agree to a negotiated outcome.

Information is critical to the termination of civil conflict. Withholding or misrepresenting private information can make reaching a stable and mutually agreeable negotiated settlement difficult. For example, one side's estimate of its ability to win on the battlefield, tolerance of the costs of fighting, reservation points, and possible compromises would all be held closely. Additionally, revealing a lack of resolve would send a signal of weakness, as would betraying a conciliatory bargaining position. Asymmetric information and the risk of revealing the 'true' value of a peaceful settlement can make bilateral negotiations difficult at best. Furthermore, there are often cultural barriers, ethnic or religious cleavages or histories of entrenched animosities that make credible information critical but scarce. In this environment, facilitating communication and building trust between opponents are instrumental to making peace possible.

Parties in a civil war, moreover, face a security dilemma unlike most others in global affairs—what Walter (2002) sees as the inability to make a credible commitment to demobilize and disarm. The commitment to disarmament is central to civil war termination because a stable society cannot exist with two or more competing centers of authority (Tilly, 1978). Disarmament needs to be a negotiated outcome, if it is not the result of military victory.

A relatively recent contribution to the study of mediation generally and the management of civil wars specifically has examined formally the conditions under which mediator bias, mediator preferences, and mediator 'honesty' influence the effectiveness of the mediator (Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2007). The ideas that come out of these formal treatments, however, have not been subjected to systematic empirical verification. That is, the effect of mediator bias—which in one form is an attribute that is assumed to be anathema to successful mediation (Bercovitch, 1997), and in another an attribute that might facilitate successful outcomes (Kydd, 2003)—has not been tested against data. Given the theoretical and policy importance of these diametrically opposed ideas about the role of mediator bias, testing is important.

To aid testing of broad models of civil war outcomes, the effect of bias on mediation, or external actors and post-conflict stability, we introduce a dataset on diplomatic forms of intervention into civil wars. These new data will help forge a link in our understanding of conflict management, and help solidify what we know about UN peacekeeping, military or economic interventions, and how security guarantees and peace agreements materialize and are implemented.

2.1.2 Data on Diplomatic Interventions

Knowledge is limited about diplomatic efforts to end civil war, in large part because we have not had access to systematic data with which to test when it might be effective. Studies of international conflict have long argued that external parties use a combination of carrots and sticks to end conflict (e.g. Singer, 1963). However, previous datasets have tended to code characteristics of the conflict (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) or aspects of interventions targeted at the structure of the relationship among combatants (Regan, 1996; 2002). The data we describe below provides a way to examine the effects of external interventions that incorporate diplomatic initiatives, alone or in combination with military or economic efforts.

We focus primarily on mediation because it forms the bulk of external diplomatic efforts in the post-World War II period. Other forms of diplomatic efforts include international forums, recalling ambassadors, or arbitration. In relative terms, there are but only a few occurrences of these other diplomatic tools when compared to the frequency of mediation.

Conceptually, we view diplomatic initiatives as attempts by outside parties to transform a conflict by enhancing communication between warring parties and providing information about the conflict that can help generate movement toward negotiated outcomes. In addition, the outside party(ies) can tie information to explicit carrots or sticks by linking diplomacy to possible economic or military interventions. We code data on four specific forms of diplomatic interventions: 1) mediation, 2) international forums, 3) the recall of ambassadors, and 4) explicit offers to mediate by third parties that were not accepted by both sides. In addition we code requests for diplomatic intervention by one of the warring parties that were not accepted. Data were derived from public sources such as the New York Times, Keesings' Contemporary Archives, Facts on File, and case-specific historical treatments.

For an operational definition of mediation, international forum, or offers to mediate, we rely on the work of Bercovitch (1997) where mediation is a non-coercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, non-binding form of intervention. Mediators enter into a conflict to affect, change, modify, or influence the outcome. The mediator can represent a state or a non-state actor. Other forms of external diplomacy include: an international forum is a formally organized meeting of the representatives from several countries, where the outcome is non-binding; the recall of an ambassador (or the ranking representative in the country) occurs when the intervening government calls home the ranking diplomat and the recall is explicitly tied to the behavior of the state in its internal conflict; and offers to mediate represent an explicit offer from a third party that was not accepted by at least one of the warring parties. They are recorded on the date of the offer.

Third-party mediation is unique because participation relies on the voluntary agreement by all parties. Before starting they have generally agreed to the format, the location, and the range of issues to be discussed. Mediators first work to convince warring parties to try to settle their differences at the negotiation table and then they work to maximize communication and minimize distrust between the civil war parties. This transmission of information is critical to understanding how outside interventions can affect the outcome of civil conflicts. A critical and unique characteristic of mediation is that mediators both initiate and facilitate peaceful bargaining: the mediator helps provide information that both sides see as credible and that gives both sides sufficient grounds to move toward a compromise outcome and possibly sign and implement a peace agreement.

2.2 Link between Resource Sharing and Conflict Management

Historically, literature pertaining to conflict management has been dominated by a debate emanating from competing methods of political power sharing. More recently, however, scholars have also begun to consider military, territorial, and economic power sharing arrangements as well as institutional alternatives to power sharing—power dividing and partition. The former alternative to power sharing was proposed by Roeder & Rothchild (2005) and has received limited scholarly attention. The latter alternative has roused a considerable degree more attention but has not been empirically analyzed with any consistent results. The existing literature has also failed to produce any semblance of consensus among scholars as to the question of which institution (power sharing, power dividing, or partition) provides the best method of initiating a transition from conflict to peace or consolidating peace durability in a post-conflict society. Even among proponents of a particular institution, scholars are divided in a lively debate as to the details of how their arrangements should be implemented and for what purpose.

In addition, while scholars have produced an impressive compendium of literature pertaining to power sharing and partition as methods of consolidating peace durability, empirical tests have largely focused on which of the respective methods is most associated with durable peace and have stopped short of asking how these methods achieve that end or why they fail to do so. Furthermore, factors highlighted by past work interested in identifying the determinants of whether peace proves durable tend to be immutable characteristics such as prewar democracy scores (Hoddie & Hartzel 2001). There is, then, a need to investigate factors contributing to peace durability which can be affected by institutional decision making; moreover, it is neccesary to see how the primary methods of conflict management impact these mutable characteristics.

2.2.1 Alternative Functions of Power Sharing
Jarstad (2006) explains that the term power sharing has been employed in two separate strands of literature but that it serves a separate function in each. One literary thread pertains to democratic theory and the other pertains to conflict management. The former generally focuses on political methods of power sharing that offer rival groups a role in the political process and primarily serve to produce functional democracy in divided societies. In the latter, scholars treat power sharing as a method of ending conflict and maintaining peace but focus on territorial and military power as well as political power sharing.
In the context of democratic theory, the power sharing literature is dominated by a line of argumentation emanating from two alternative approaches to joint governance. The first approach is frequently described as consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969, 1977, 1979, 2004). This method of joint governance is characterized by (A) segmental

autonomy and (B) representation within a 'grand coalition' for all major factions of a divided society. Delegates within the 'grand coalition,' or committee of group-leaders, are selected through a proportional electoral system to represent their respective groups. Delegates in the grand coalition, armed with the power of mutual veto, defend the interests of their groups in a negotiated series of concessions and compromises. According to the theory, this process should produce a stable democracy under terms acceptable to all the major factions in a society. Additionally, consociationalism should have the added benefit of promoting a vertical divide between rival groups that allows each group to compete with all of the others (Lijphart 1969, 1977, 1979, 2004).

The major alternative to Lijphart's consociationalism originates with Horowitz (1985) and was labeled centripetalism in Reilly (2001). This approach attempts to eliminate dividing identities within the population of a society by promoting greater integration through a majoritarian electoral system. On the other hand, centripetalism limits the number of political parties and produces a horizontal division such that one group in a society maintains clear dominance over all of the others (Horowitz 1985). Ultimately, however, Lijphart's theory of consociationalism and Horowitz's theory labeled centripetalism *both* focus on electoral systems and both seek to produce stable democracy in divided societies through joint governance.

In the context of conflict management, however, the power sharing literature encompasses institutions that endow former antagonists with political power but also includes institutions pertaining to economic, military, or territorial power. Although much of the literature provides extensive coverage of political power sharing, new debates are arising as to whether this is the most effective method of conflict resolution or peace maintenance. In fact, some advocates of power sharing as a method of maintaining peace durability have argued that political power sharing pacts make no significant difference and only agreements with military and territorial power sharing provisions help to consolidate peace (Jarstad & Nilsson 2008). On the other hand, some scholars have come to the opposite conclusion (Mattes & Savun 2009; Derrouen, Lea, & Wallensteen 2009).

There is a great deal of disagreement among scholars of conflict management concerning the function of power sharing. For example, Roeder & Rothchild (2005) hold that while power-sharing may be an effective tool for initiating a transition from ongoing conflict to peace, it hampers the process of consolidating a durable peace in post conflict societies. On the other hand, many scholars examining power sharing find it to be a very useful tool for maintaining peace durability and preventing war recurrence in post conflict societies (Hartzell 2009; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson 2008). Gates & Strom (2007) find that power-sharing may be an effective method of preventing conflict from occurring to start with, and criticizes scholars such as Hartzell & Hoddie (2007) for not having taken this into consideration.

In summation, scholars of conflict management disagree on whether or not power sharing is effective for (A) preventing conflict, (B) resolving conflict, and/or (C) consolidating peace stability. They generally agree, however, that power sharing institutions encompass not only political power sharing but also military, economic, and territorial power sharing.

2.2.2 Partition and Conflict Management

Although the attention of the literature on conflict management has generally been monopolized by power sharing, partition has recently become a popular alternative. Scholars have alternatively found partition effective for initiating an end to ongoing conflict (Kaufmann 1996, 1998), consolidating peace durability (Chapman & Roeder 2007), and preventing war recurrence in post conflict societies (Johnson 2010). Literature on partition is also divided on the topic of de facto separation. While Kaufmann (1996, 1998) and Johnson (2010) maintain that de facto separation involving the geographical division of demographic groups into defensible enclaves supersedes sovereignty, Chapman & Roeder (2007) find that de facto separation is of secondary importance as compared to de jure partition dividing a single administrative units into two or more sovereign entities with international recognition. However, while details of pro-partition arguments have varied, all of these scholars agree that partition is a method of conflict management specifically designed for ethnic and nationalist conflicts. For example, Kaufmann (1996, 1998) provides the strongest theoretical argument for partition when he posits the concept of an ethnic security dilemma emerging from adversarial ethnic identities hardened by conflict.

Some scholars have resisted the notion that partition is an effective method for peace management of any form. Jenne (2009), for example, examined the de facto partition of Bosnia and Kosovo to argue that partition is an ineffective tool during the peace-consolidation stage of conflict management. Sambanis (2000) provided more generalizable results with the first empirical test of the usefulness of partition as a method of conflict management. Although the study found that partition was not useful in either the initiation phase or the consolidation phase of conflict management, it has not proved to be a robust finding. Chapman & Roeder (2007) reanalyzed data from Sambanis (2000) and arrived at opposite conclusions.

Although Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) offer some explanation for the contrary conclusions, they do not provide an effective response to the primary pro-partition arguments posited by Kaufmann (1996). While Kaufmann (1996) held sovereignty to be secondary to de facto separation, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) did not take the

degree of population transfer into account with their preferred definition of partition. As theory proposed in Kaufman (1996, 1998) advocates demographic separation, it is neccesary to measure the degree of population transfer in order to test the theory. Perhaps a better test of Kaufmann's argument is provided by Johnson (2010) as it contains an index for measuring the degree of population transfer. However, Johnson's result contradicted both the argument of Kaufmann (1996, 1998) and Sambanis (2000) as it held that while partition does help to prevent war recurrence in post conflict societies, it does not help to end an ongoing conflict. Ultimately, however, even within pro-partition circles, scholars remain divided on the role that partition should play as a method of conflict management and more thorough examination is necessary to augment existing literature.

2.2.3 Power Dividing and Conflict Management

In contrast to the preceding two methods of conflict management, power dividing is a fairly new idea originating with Roeder & Rothchild (2005) that has received comparatively limited scholarly attention. Power dividing is characterized by checks and balances, multiple majorities, and strong civil liberties. While power sharing focuses on creating organizations to guide a divided society into some semblance of unity, power dividing aims to empower people with universal rights under the assumption that the mutual effort to protect shared liberties will serve as a natural catalyst for unity. Power dividing, as the theory goes, prevents the division of civil society along ethnic lines by empowering the people to establish a means of government protecting mutually held civil rights and liberties.

However, Roeder & Rothchild (2005) recommend power dividing only for the consolidation of peace durability and the prevention of war recurrence in post-conflict society. They maintain that power sharing is a more pragmatic tool during the initiation phase of the peace process (Roeder & Rothchild 2005). However, Roeder argues that by endowing citizens with universal, individual rights and the freedom of association as opposed to group rights, power dividing ensures that individuals of diverse backgrounds will cooperate in defending constitutional order against challenges that might unravel the system of civil rights from which they all benefit. Additionally, because power dividing swings some control over controversial issues from government jurisdiction to that of civil society by allowing the people to decide how interests are separated, it should produce a resolution more acceptable to the people (Roeder 2010).

Nevertheless, very little has been done to empirically test the theory. One attempt was made by Gold (2011) but this ultimately concluded on a note of ambivalence with no clear conclusion. This is perhaps to be expected. The cases cited to provide examples of power dividing or to evidence the effectiveness of power dividing as a deterrent for renewed conflict by Roeder & Rothchild (2005) are either instances in which power dividing appears to be present but was not implemented as a method of conflict management (such as the United States) or cases generally described as power-sharing (Switzerland, Belgium, and India). Furthermore, the preponderance of western countries in the pool of examples raises questions as to whether the institution of power dividing is applicable outside of a western context. In any case, the small number of cases in which power dividing was used as a method of conflict management makes it impossible for any reliable, empirical analysis of its effectiveness for either initiating a transition from conflict to peace or consolidating peace durability in a post-conflict society.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology that was used to carry out the research. It presents the research design, the target population, sample size, sampling procedure, research instrument, validity and reliability of the instrument, ethical consideration, data analysis and limitation of the study.

3.1 Research Design
Research design is the structure of any scientific work which gives direction and systematizes on how the study is done; it constitutes the collection, measurement and analysis of data (Kothari, 2004). The study will use a survey and content analysis of the effect of diplomatic relations and resource sharing on conflict management in Juba County, South Sudan. The study will focused also on the survey of community members. A survey research design seeks to obtain information that describes existing phenomenon by asking individuals about their perceptions, attitudes and values (Mugenda, 2003). The study finally will use descriptive survey design. Descriptive survey research design is the systematic collection of data in standardized form an identifiable population or representative (Oso and Onen, 2009). Descriptive approach thus ensured that comprehensive findings and depth information obtained on the subject matter.

3.2 Study population
The research will be carried out in Juba County in Central Equatorial State. The population will comprise of 348 people from the county. The researcher clustered this to 8 Administrative staff, 40 Operational staff and 300 citizens of Juba County (Table1.1)

Table: 1.1: Population size

Target Group	Population
Administrative staff	8
Operational staff	40
Citizens	300
Total	**348**

Source: Primary Data

3.3 Sampling Procedure
The researcher will use both probability and non-probability sampling techniques so as to be exhaustive in the research findings. Random sampling will be used as a probability technique to obtain a good representative sample of the area population of the residents. Purposive sampling technique will be used as a non-probability technique for the leaders only but as key informants.

3.4 Sample Size
The sample size will be calculated using the Krejcie and Morgan Table (1970) for determining the sample, as this gave a practical ratio based on the County's population size. According to Krejcie and Morgan Table, approximately 213 respondents will be used as a sample size of the entire population (350). The researcher clustered this population according to the two counties. The researcher further categorized them into two groups, one of leaders (44) and the other of residents (169).

Table: 1.2: Sample size distribution

Target Group	Population	Sample
Administrative staff	8	8
Operational staff	40	36
Citizens	300	169
Total	**448**	**213**

Source: Primary Data

3.4 Research Instrument
The study will use primary data that will be collected using questionnaire, interview and observation these instrument are appropriate as it will help the researcher to collect information that will be directly observable as they will inquire about feelings, motivations; attitudes, accomplishments as well as experiences of individuals (Sutrisna, 2009). Closed and open -ended questions will guide the respondents' answers within the choices given. The questionnaires will be administered through pick and drop and use of email.

3.5 Content Analysis
Information gathered through content analysis will be used to supplement and enrich the information collected from other instruments. In addition, library, field pieces of information will be supplemented by more information obtained from the internet. Then information obtained from these sources will be then analyzed and reduced in to a written text.

3.6 Validity of the Instrument

Validity means the relationship of data obtained in various sections being studied. According to Smith (2003), validity measures the degree to which the research or study achieves what it sets out to do. Validity of the instrument will be therefore established by using expert judgment. It will be scientifically determined by using content validity index formula. The instrument will be thereafter submitted for comments to the three supervisors (experts), whereby suggestions will be accepted and judgments will be made on the content validity of the instrument. The instrument will be considered valid when the CVI gotten is above 0.60 as recommended by Lynn (1986).

3.7 Reliability of the Instrument

Reliability refers to the degree of consistency and precision in which the measuring of instruments is demonstrated (Amin, 2005). According to Smith (2003), reliability establishes the consistency of a research instrument in that the results it achieves should be similar in similar circumstances and so the same research respondents using the same instrument should generate the same results under identical conditions. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) will be used to determine the reliability of the instrument before collecting the data. A pretest of the questionnaire to prove reliability will be carried out in another organization which will not part of the study area and 10 questionnaires will be administered and used to generate the reliability coefficient of determination. A reliability test using a Cronbach's alpha $\alpha \geq 0.7$ and above will be considered adequate (Cronbanch, 2004).

3.8 Ethical Consideration

An introduction letter will be obtained from the research department's office, University of Juba to introduce the researcher and the purpose of the study to the leaders of Juba County, after the permission will be sought from the leaders, the researcher will make appointment for the date of data collection. The research will work hand in hand with the leaders to construct the sample frame. The questionnaire, interview and observation will be to collect data from the employees. After data collection, the researcher will sort and code the responses for data analysis. Data will be edited while still in the field to correct errors and mistakes.

3.9 Data Analysis

The collected data will be coded and entries will be made into Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 20). Descriptive statistics include: frequency and percentages distribution will be used to analyze the objectives. Pearson correlation will be used to analyse objective one and two; regression analysis will be used to analyse the last objective.

3.10 imitation of the Study

As it is not easy for the rowing boat against a strong current, the media sensitivity on Child labor research in Juba; may as well encounter several challenges such as:

1. Non – Cooperative individuals who may not be willing to share information and ideas that are relevant to this research topic may also be another factor that could hinder attainment of quick intended results.

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Questionnaire for expert interviews

1. What is the policy towards the secessionist conflicts in the Juba County?

2. How the Government understands the end-goal of the conflict resolution, on your opinion?

3. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of the Government on the conflicts management in Juba County?

4. Which factors determine engagement of the Government in the conflict management in the County?

5. Do you see the effectiveness of the Government dependent on the general image of the Government among the conflicting parties?