Abstract: -
Political Thought is divided into three general areas of study. The first looks at the history of political thought. This historical aspect of political thought is itself divided into three periods, with three basic Concentrations. The major periods are ancient, medieval, and modern and the three Concentrations are Western, oriental and Korean. Population is a subset of the target population and is also known as the study population. The accessible population is the population in research to which the researchers can apply their conclusions; it is from the accessible population that researchers draw their samples. The survey population that was researched on included; Technical staff (40), which comprised of Technocrats of SPLM Party, focal person, administrators like public relation officers, political experts and some support staff, twenty (20) beneficiaries of SPLM Party in the Republic of South Sudan. Most of the participants who responded ‘Yes’ constituted lion share of 72.9% while those who said ‘No’ that the current government of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) does not encourage the development of political thought made up 27.1% of the respondents. According to majority point of views, the current government of TGoNU has been playing a significant roles in encouraging the development of political thought in the country. And according to results, 62.5% said ‘Yes’ the current political parties support the development of polities though in the country while 37.5% presents those who opposed the statement due to their owns perception of the current political parties’ activities this concurred with sultan Yosa Wawa who said in a conference that political parties support the development of political policies It was shown that 87.5% majority of participants responded ‘Yes’ they think the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice in support of political thought however, 12.5% among participants said ‘No’. The statement is proven to correct by majority of the respondents who have agreed with it. In other hand, 52.1% said ‘No’, there is no a realistic opportunity for the political parties in South Sudan to build the political ideology while 47.9% of participants responded ‘Yes’ there is a space for political parties to establish political ideology. Based on the finding results, majority of the respondents were politically frustrated and hence they don’t see any ground of establishing a beneficial political ideology due poor political ideals developed in the country.
CHAPTER ONE

1.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the background, problem statement, purpose of the study, objective of the study, hypothesis, research questions, scope of the study, significance of the study, methodology, organization of the research and conceptual framework.

1.1. Background of the Study

Political Thought is more than a field within Political Science— it is an important sense, its foundation. However, politics or Political Science is defined, there is a need to understand both normative and empirical problems in politics. Political Thought deals with the normative aspect of Political Science. In this regard, it demonstrates the limits to Political Science and allows us to understand what we know and what We do not. Political Thought teaches us what questions to ask in Political Science.

Political Thought is divided into three general areas of study. The first looks at the history of political thought. This historical aspect of political thought is itself divided into three periods, with three basic Concentrations. The major periods are ancient, medieval, and modern and the three Concentrations are Western, oriental and Korean. The second area of study is Political Philosophy. Political Philosophy is premised on a normative, universal and abstract approach to Political Science; it encourages us to think carefully about the Contemporary values of politics. The third area is Political Ideology. In this area, research centers on liberalism, Conservatism, and socialism. The objective is to identify the relationship between political thought and reality.

In July 2011, South Sudan celebrated its secession from Sudan as a triumph of both “bullets and ballots,” invoking Malcolm X’s call to action in 1964. There is little sense of a revolutionary politics today. Instead, a dominant (bleak, neopatrimonial) analysis of South Sudan describes divided and defensive ethno-local communities manipulated by exploitative and greedy military elites in a battle for control of the oil tap. There is a common idea that there was little emotional content or intellectual substance to South Sudan’s national independence beyond a reactionary resistance to generations of violent colonization.

But this neglects the rich and diverse history of South Sudanese people’s political cultures and projects during the last three civil wars since the 1960s. In Sudan’s capital Khartoum of the 1980s and 1990s, a population of about two million displaced southern and Darfuri residents constructed impoverished but dynamic black suburbs, in which people of all backgrounds engaged in a rich conversation about what Sudanese independence, self-determination, and political community could look like.

1.2. Problem Statement

The history of political thought dates back to antiquity while the history of the world and thus the history of political thinking by man stretches up through the Medieval period and the Renaissance. In the Age of Enlightenment, political entities expanded from basic systems of self-governance and monarchy to the complex democratic and communist systems that exist of the Industrialized and the Modern Era. In parallel, political systems have expanded from vaguely defined frontier-type boundaries, to the definite boundaries existing today. The history of political thought has often overlapped with the history of philosophy.

The development of political thought has brought significant changes to the independence of the Republic of South Sudan. The catalyst speeding the political thoughts and transformation in Sudan include the rebellion in the South, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountain. There is lack of political thought (ideology) in the ruling party. This study therefore, examine cause of the political thought in the SPLM.

1.3. Purpose of the study

The purpose of this research is to highlight the political thought in South Sudan political development from 2005 – 2019.

1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The major objectives of this research is to assess the development of political thought in South Sudan. The specific objectives of the study are:

i. To determine the extent in which political thought development has been enhance in Sudan and South Sudan.
ii. To find found the significant of political thought in South Sudanese political development

1.5. Hypothesis

Key assumptions that connotes to the existence of political thought is that it is expected to be knowledge driven, which means that actors, or at least members of various political parties have requisite skills to enhance political development and peaceful coexistence in the country.

1. Is it Political ideology is reliable to the political environment.
2. Or The political ideology assessment is not flexible to observe these ideologists.
1.6. Research Questions
1. What are the factors hindering the development of political thought in South Sudan?

The Scope and Limitations of the Study
The scope of this study will cover essentially the development of political thought in South Sudan from 1947 – 2019.

1.7. Significance of the Study
This research work will provide relevant answers to the bothering thoughts of scholars who are interested in the development of political. This research will also provide guideline to policy makers as regards to the kind of policies they make, that will match the desires of a society and subsequently the various conflict on South Sudan political development in South Sudan. If the policies made or adopted by a particular government in power, does not go down well with the people it might trigger reactions by the various political parties, whose impact can help government. But if the policy is a good one, then the government would receive the applause and support of these parties.

1.8. Methodology and tools
i. The study used a combination of methodologies, including survey, historical and descriptive methods.
ii. The study used both primary and secondary data. Regarding the primary data collection process, sample size (100). The study shall investigate the respondents in respective organization as shown below;
   a) The political parties
   b) Civil Society Organization and
   c) The Society in general through structured questionnaires

1.9. Geographical Scope
The research will be carried out in South Sudan since it is the area selected for study to assess the roles of political parties in democratic transformation governance in South Sudan. SPLM is the largest ruling party in South Sudan which was established before independent by Arabic invaders. The geographical area under which the researcher will carry out his will be Munuki Payam SPLM Secretariat, Central Equatoria – South Sudan.

Chapter One (1) Introduction of study (research proposal) which include the Background of the Study, statement of problem, objectives of the study, significance of the study, hypotheses, scope and limitation of the study.

Chapter two (2) Literature Review of the study.

Chapter Three is to focus on the Research Methodology of the study which covers Research Design, sample size, determination sample allocation, sample selection procedures, data collection methods, data collection instruments, and ethical considerations and data analysis methods.

Chapter four (4) is to covers data analysis, discussion and interpretation of the findings talked about findings of the case study or appraisal of this research work, which is; the civil liberties and socio-political development. Further treating sub-topics like; civil liberties and the war against corruption in South Sudan.

The fifth chapter (5) which is the last but not the less interesting, includes the summary of this research work, the conclusion and of course recommendation, where the researcher recommended points that would enable effective and efficient participation of political parties and subsequently increased growth in the socio-political development of South Sudan.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction
Political Thought is more than a field within Political Science. It is an important sense, its foundation. However, politics or Political Science is defined, there is a need to understand both normative and empirical problems in politics. Political Thought deals with the normative aspect of Political Science\(^1\). In this regard, it demonstrates the limits to Political Science and allows us to understand what we know and what we do not. Political Thought teaches us what questions to ask in Political Science.

Political Thought is divided into three general areas of study. The first looks at the history of political thought. This historical aspect of political thought is itself divided into three periods, with three basic Concentrations\(^2\). The major periods are ancient, medieval, and modern and the three Concentrations are Western, oriental and Korean. The second area of study is Political Philosophy. Political Philosophy is premised on a normative, universal and abstract approach to Political Science; it encourages us to think carefully about the Contemporary values of politics\(^3\). The third area is Political Ideology. In this area, research centers on liberalism, Conservatism, and socialism. The objective is to identify the relationship between political thought and reality.

2.1 The history of political thought
Political Thought has developed with the overall advancement of Political Science. In the past, like most other academic fields, research in Political Thought revolved around western political thought. This reflected an ethnocentric bias in the development of Political Science, but this tendency has recently been challenged\(^4\). Today, there is much greater interest in other traditions, including the Korean intellectual tradition. A great deal of effort is now being exerted to understand normative problems that arise in domestic politics through the lens of Korean political thought.

2.2. School of Political Thought
The School’s approach to political theory engages with a wide range of questions and perspectives\(^5\). It coheres around common interests in critical theoretical traditions, the application of theoretical ideas in political life, and a blurring of the distinction between domestic and international political theory. Staff have research interests in post-colonialism, democratic theory, global ethics, the history of political thought, feminist philosophy, Marxist theory, radical politics and theories of identity and representation. Our critical research supports theoretically informed scholarship across the School, helping to create connections between political theory and other research themes.

In 2013, the School launched the TheoryLab to develop collaborative research and innovation in contemporary political theory. TheoryLab\(^6\) explores points of connection and convergence between different kinds of critical theory within and beyond the study of politics. Staff are also active in the Centre for the Study of the History of Political Thought.

Recent research by staff working in political theory includes the four-year research project Women and the History of International Thought, starting in July 2018, funded by the Leverhulme Trust and led by Patricia Owens (University of Sussex), Katharina Rietzler (University of Sussex), and Kimberly Hutchings (Queen Mary University of London). It aims to systematically recover and evaluate the international thought of women both inside and outside academe during the early to mid-twentieth-century. World of the Right (WoR)\(^7\) is a three-year (2017-2020) research project on the radical, nationalist and often populist Right currently on the rise across Europe and the US. Sponsored by the Danish Velux Foundation, the project provides basic research on the commonalities and variations of the new Western Right and on the narrative which seems to unite it: that of an imminent Western civilizational decline\(^8\).

2.3. Constraints of Political Thought
Errors arise when scholars wrongly attribute certain beliefs to authors of classic works. If scholars have a strong interest in a problem, they might get carried away and attribute a belief concerning the problem to a given author even though the evidence is not sufficient to enable them so to do. Imagine, for example, that a scholar interested in the virtues and vices to a given author even though the evidence is not sufficient to enable them so to do. Imagine, for example, that a scholar interested in the virtues and vices of a constitution based on a separation of powers scour Aristotel's works looking for comments relating to this problem,

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\(^8\) Liberal Party. 10 August 1965 ‘Proposal for the Government of the Southern Region of Sudan’, NRO South 1/44.
and thereby builds a doctrine they call Aristotle’s view of the separation of powers. A critic might argue that the evidence did not support the claim that Aristotle held these views. Here we would have a debate about what Aristotle believed. Second, errors arise when scholars treat indirect references to beliefs that suggest an answer to a problem as though they were direct statements of beliefs specifically addressed to the problem. If scholars find that an author occasionally expressed beliefs on a particular subject, they might get carried away and present these scattered remarks as though the author set out to address this subject in a particular way, when obviously the author did no such thing. Imagine, for example, that a scholar says Aristotle wrote about the separation of powers. A critic might argue that Aristotle did not write about the separation of powers, but rather indirectly expressed various beliefs of relevance to a consideration of the separation of powers. Here we would have a debate, not about what Aristotle believed, but about what problems Aristotle meant to address.

Finally, errors arise when scholars do not frame problems in a sufficiently abstract manner. If scholars find that an author expressed beliefs relevant to a contemporary problem, they might describe the problem using concepts that are too culturally specific to embrace the beliefs the author actually had. If a scholar wrote about Aristotle’s view of the separation of powers, for example, a critic might object that Aristotle could not have held any beliefs about the separation of powers because the concept of the separation of powers only makes sense against a background of beliefs Aristotle did not hold. Here our scholar could reply that they mean something less specific than does their critic by the separation of powers; perhaps, they mean something more like constitutional theory. Thus, we might have a debate, not about what Aristotle believed, or about what problems Aristotle meant to address, but about the way in which we should define the separation of powers.

2.4. Background of the Study

In 2011, South Sudan celebrated its secession from Sudan as a triumph of both “bullets and ballots,” invoking Malcolm X’s call to action in 1964. There is little sense of a revolutionary politics today. Instead, a dominant (bleak, neopatrimonial) analysis of South Sudan describes divided and defensive ethno-local communities manipulated by exploitative and greedy military elites in a battle for control of the oil tap. There is a common idea that there was little emotional content or intellectual substance to South Sudan’s national independence beyond a reactionary resistance to generations of violent colonization.

This contemporary history evidences a far wider intellectual culture in conflict than the dominant narrative of South Sudan’s civil wars and national “birth” in 2011 allow. These old radical ideas, projects and people still hold significant power, as songs, books and individual intellectuals’ old work are cited on message boards and passed as MP3s and re-photocopied pamphlets. Most of the surviving songwriters and poets and playwrights and teachers I have met are still working. Their work, and the possibilities held in these intellectual cultures, are missing from current discussions around reconciliation and national dialogues. But these older projects of political thought and education might contain useful weight and substance in the continuing and fundamental conversation in South Sudan on what was being fought for, and what political community should and can be built on this history.

The history of political thought dates back to antiquity while the history of the world and thus the history of political thinking by man stretches up through the medieval period and the Renaissance. In the Age of Enlightenment, political entities expanded from basic systems of self-governance and monarchy to the complex democratic and communist systems that exist of the Industrialized and the Modern Era. In parallel, political systems have expanded from vaguely defined frontier-type boundaries, to the definite boundaries existing today. The history of political thought has often overlapped with the history of philosophy.

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9 Imagine, for example, that a scholar interested in the virtues and vices of a constitution based on a separation of powers scours Aristotle’s works looking for comments relating to this problem, and thereby builds a doctrine they call Aristotle’s view of the separation of powers.

10 Imagine, for example, that a scholar says Aristotle wrote about the separation of powers.

11 Finally, errors arise when scholars do not frame problems in a sufficiently abstract manner.

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16 In the Age of Enlightenment, political entities expanded from basic systems of self-governance and monarchy to the complex democratic and communist systems that exist of the Industrialized and the Modern Era. In parallel, political systems.
2.5. The Origin of Political Thought in Sudan and South Sudan

2.5.1. The Juba Conference of 1947

The first time that the collective opinion of southern Sudanese was canvassed concerning a national political issue was at the Juba Conference of 1947. Since 1930, British administrative policy in the Sudan had kept open the possibility that the southern provinces might one day be transferred to colonial authority in British East Africa. This remained a theoretical option only: it could not be done as long as Sudan remained an Egyptian colony in international law. Egypt was a partner in the condominium that ruled Sudan and East African governments were unenthusiastic about the idea of the southern Sudanese provinces joining them. In 1946, with Egypt attempting to reassert its sovereignty over the whole of Sudan, and with northern nationalist groups articulating demands for self-government and self-determination within Sudan’s geographical boundaries, a separate administrative future for the southern Sudan was no longer even a theoretical possibility, and the Sudan government prepared a new policy linking the future of the “South” inextricably with that of the “North”. But some consultation with the educated leadership of the south—junior administrative officials, teachers, and chiefs—was deemed necessary, if only for form’s sake. Following a preliminary survey of southern opinion, a conference was convened in Juba in June 1947.

The conference was exploratory and could take no decisions by itself. Its main purpose was to find out if the nascent leadership of the southern, educated class was willing and able to take part as appointed members in the Legislative Assembly that was being established in Khartoum. The first day of the conference ended in no agreement, but that night the southern delegates held a meeting with some 200 southern clerks and junior officials living in Juba. The meeting lasted until two o’clock in the morning. Finally, Paulino Cyer Rehan17, one of the Dinka chiefs at the conference, spoke.

2.5.1. 1948–1957: Self-Determination, Independence, and Federalism

Thirteen southerners were appointed to the Legislative Assembly, including Stanislaus Paysama and Paulino Cyer Rehan from Bahr el-Ghazal; Buth Diu and Edward Odhok Dodigo from Upper Nile; and Benjamin Lwoki and Andarea Gore from Equatoria. The southern members formed a bloc of opinion but were not yet a party18. At first they had no agreed plan for a system of government. When the Umma Party brought forward a self-government motion in 1950, southerners led the opposition to it on the grounds that not enough had been done to enable the south to participate in self-government on an equal basis. Their proposal for a special minister of “Southern Affairs” in a future self-governing Sudan was voted down by the northern members. They agreed to continue participation in the constitutional process only when the northern legislators accepted a provision for the governor-general to retain reserved powers over the southern provinces and the civil service. Southerners saw these as important safeguards against the potential abuse of power by a future northern majority government, but they were highly unpopular provisions among northern parties.

The political landscape of Sudan abruptly changed with the All Parties Agreement of January 195319, in which Egypt—supported by the northern parties—stated the conditions on which it would agree to a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty establishing the terms for self-government in the Sudan and the exercise of self-determination. The governor-general’s reserve powers over the south and the civil service were to be dropped, and self-determination for the country as a whole was to be a choice between the alternatives of union with Egypt or complete independence.

The exclusion of southern representatives from these talks, the northern parties’ extra-parliamentary repudiation of the constitutional formula agreed with southern representatives in the Legislative Assembly, and the Egyptian government’s attempt to further circumvent the South’s parliamentary representatives, led to two important developments: the first was the formation of southern Sudan’s first political party, the Liberal Party, to contest the 1953 elections; and the second was the articulation of a possible separate self-determination for the south with the threat of withdrawing from the constitutional process and finding ‘other alternatives to determine its own future’.

2.5.2. Exile, Self-Determination, and the Revival of Federalism

The Abboud regime put an end to parliamentary politics and any public discussion of federalism as a constitutional solution for Sudan. This drove several southern leaders into exile to organize armed opposition to Khartoum20. With the outbreak of civil war in the southern Sudan in the early 1960s, the idea of federation was driven underground, and some southerners now opted for the idea of total independence. Fr. Saturnino Lohure and Joseph Oduho, both staunch federalists in parliament, formed the exile Sudan African National Union (SANU), whose stated goal was self-determination, a code word for independence.

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20 The Abboud regime put an end to parliamentary politics and any public discussion of federalism as a constitutional solution for Sudan. This drove several southern leaders into exile to organize armed opposition to Khartoum.
The downfall of the military government in 1964 led to a renewal of open party politics and a commitment to a public forum on the southern Sudan at a round table conference convened early in 1965. A new party, the Southern Front, identified itself with African nationalism and proclaimed as its goal freedom from Arab domination, though it left the ultimate form of that freedom undefined. Despite SANU originally standing for self-determination, the first public statements by its leader, William Deng, favoured nothing stronger than federation. There appeared little difference between the policies of SANU and the Southern Front.

Differences emerged at the Round Table Conference (its official title) convened in Khartoum in March 1965, with Aggrey Jaden, William Deng’s deputy, returning to the principle of self-determination as the only means of solving the ‘Southern Problem’, and equating self-determination with independence. The William Deng faction of SANU declared that complete unity of Sudan was out of the question, and the country could either ‘1) voluntarily break up into two or 2) federate.’ The other southern parties (including the old Liberals) did not go so far as to advocate separation, but proposed federation or regional autonomy in a variety of forms. In the end, William Deng’s SANU and the Southern Front proposed a joint programme that went beyond the original provisions of federation, towards something more resembling confederation, with the northern and southern Sudans each having control of their own finances, foreign affairs, and armed forces.

The outcome of the Round Table Conference was to be a disappointment to most southerners. SANU split between the William Deng (‘inside’) and Aggrey Jaden (‘outside’) factions as William Deng remained in the country and Jaden returned to exile and the guerrilla movement. Southern parties participated in the Twelve Man Commission, which had been set up to follow through on the Round Table proposals. The old Liberal Party re-emerged as an advocate of regional autonomy, something less than full federalism. The Southern Front now adopted the principle of self-determination (in its real meaning) as a process, and was keen to set out the details of each of the options now being proposed—dependence, federation, regional autonomy, and local government—for southern Sudanese to choose from.

SANU and the Southern Front again formed an alliance in the constitutional committee following the 1968 elections and sought to build a parliamentary alliance with other smaller regional parties. Together, the two parties opposed those articles in the draft constitution that denied regional diversity and imposed Islam and Arabic as the state religion and language. They withdrew their delegations when the northern majority voted down their amendments, precipitating a constitutional crisis that eventually resulted in the military once again overthrowing the parliamentary government.

2.5.3. 1969–1983: The Nimeiri Period

A second round of military government, beginning on 25 May 1969, brought with it an acceptance of the principle of regional autonomy for the south. The Nile Provisional Government (NPG)—one of the main exile groups with a presence in areas of the south not held by the government—rejected regional autonomy as soon as it was proposed in June 1969.

The subsequent strength of the guerrilla movement and sudden internal weakening of the military government, however, finally made negotiations possible. By this time, there was a strong southern desire for a mediated solution. Not all southern Sudanese were happy with this turn of events. The NPG had been displaced by Joseph Lagu’s South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), their leaders living in political exile in Kinshasa. In a meeting between envoys of the SSLM and the ‘Kinshasa group’, the exiles objected to the precondition stipulated by Khartoum that negotiations would proceed on the basis of a united Sudan. The SSLM had a completely different understanding of ‘regional autonomy’ from what the government was proposing, and were confident that they were sure to get federation out of the negotiations. The SSLM assumed that ‘autonomy’ meant federation, and their delegation, led by the veteran pro-federalist, Ezboni Mundiri, came to Addis Ababa armed with a proposal for a full federal structure.

The first major disagreement between the two sides was over the very use of the term ‘federal’ to describe the role of the future central government. Khartoum’s delegation argued that the People’s Local Government Act of 1971 provided all the decentralization needed for the proposed Southern Regional Government to run effectively. Ezboni Mundiri countered, saying ‘that the main question facing the conference was whether the Sudan Government delegation accepted ‘Federal System’ as the only way of solving the problem of the Sudan’. The SSLM delegation objected to the government’s detailed restrictions on the powers of the regional government, and proposed instead that the powers of the central government should first be clearly defined and all other powers then reserved for the regions, a formula adapted from the US constitution. Their goal was to have a southern region and a northern region, with the central government autonomous from either region and not synonymous with the north.

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25 The SSLM assumed that ‘autonomy’ meant federation, and their delegation, led by the veteran pro-federalist, Ezboni Mundiri, came to Addis Ababa armed with a proposal for a full federal structure.
Mansour Khalid, a member of the government delegation, brought all discussion of federalism to an end, however, when he declared ‘they could not impose Regionalism on the North when they had not asked for it.’ The SSLM was offered, and finally accepted, something that might be termed ‘Federation Lite’ in what became the Southern Regional Government. The Addis Ababa Agreement was accepted by both the Sudan government of Nimeiri and the SSLM of Lagu in 1972. Self-determination as a process was abandoned, and the agreement was never subject to popular ratification; rather, it was retroactively incorporated into the 1973 Permanent Constitution. This was to be the agreement’s undoing, for the constitution allotted powers to the president that he eventually used to override and then abolish the Southern Region.

Nationally Nimeiri followed a policy of ‘decentralization’. In 1976, he divided all of Sudan’s provinces into two. Regionalism was then introduced in the north in 1980, when the old Northern provinces were reassembled as regions. The powers of these northern regional governments were considerably less than the powers conferred on the Southern Region by the Addis Ababa Agreement. Retired general, Joseph Lagu, and his mainly Equatorian supporters used the regionalization of the north to propose a further regionalization of the south in a process colloquially known by its proponents as ‘Kokora’, the Bari word for ‘divide’ or ‘division’, and by its opponents as ‘Re-division’.

The re-division debate was generated by political power struggles in the Southern Region and the perception by many in the two Equatoria provinces that they were being excluded from power by the numerically larger Nilotic Dinka and Nuer peoples. This proposal to abolish the Southern Region—and replace it with three smaller regions of the restored Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces—gained considerable support among northern Sudanese who had always considered regional autonomy a threat to national unity. It was hotly contested by the majority of southern Sudanese, but Nimeiri favoured the minority position and abolished the Southern Region by presidential decree in June 1983.

In practice, ‘Kokora’ meant the expulsion of non-Equatorians from government and civil service positions in the regional capital of Juba and elsewhere, and their reposting to their home regions. There had been no discussion among the proponents of ‘Kokora’ about retaining a pan-regional superstructure through which southerners could coordinate and protect their common interests. If Equatorians had hoped that their new region would assume all the powers of the old Southern Regional government, they were soon disappointed, as all three southern regions were put on par with the much weaker northern regions. If the Southern Region had been a form of ‘Federalism Lite’, the three new southern regions were ‘Federalism even Liter’.

2.6. The Second Civil War, and the Positions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA)

As in the first war, the renewal of civil war in 1983 changed the direction of the political debate among southerners and between southerners and northerners away from a focus on government structures for southern Sudan only and towards the reform of government for the whole of Sudan. The SPLM/SPLA became the main opposition force actively fighting the government. Its manifesto was broadly Marxist in tone, but its analysis of the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was rooted in debates that pre-dated 1972. Its offer of a structural analysis of the Southern Region’s weaknesses; its repudiation of a ‘Southern Problem’ to be considered in isolation of the rest of the country; its replacement with what it termed the ‘nationalities’ problem; and its proposal for a restructured, united Sudan, reached back to the early days of a federalist alliance between southern and regionalist parties in the 1958 and 1968 parliaments. The SPLM/SPLA manifesto was silent, however, on what form of government a restructured, united Sudan might adopt. In direct negotiations with various northern political groups between 1986 and 1988, the SPLM/SPLA showed how far the debate had moved on since the Round Table Conference in 1965, redirecting it from proposed constitutional arrangements for the south alone to a broader debate about power in the country. Gone were calls for either federation or self-determination; they were replaced by a consistent demand for a National Constitutional Convention.

With the overthrow of Nimeiri in April 1985, new, internal, southern Sudanese parties emerged, many with broad, national-sounding titles that in reality represented only provincial or even smaller constituencies. Southern political leaders disagreed about their objectives. The most common proposal was a return to the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the resurrection of a single Southern Region as a means by which southerners themselves could resolve their differences. The SPLM/SPLA, though, maintained its position that a return to the pre-1983 constitutional structures was out of the question. In their analysis, the Addis Ababa Agreement had failed to address the fundamental inequalities.

26 Mansour Khalid, a member of the government delegation, brought all discussion of federalism to an end, however, when he declared ‘they could not impose Regionalism on the North when they had not asked for it.

27 Retired general, Joseph Lagu, and his mainly Equatorian supporters used the regionalization of the north to propose a further regionalization of the south in a process colloquially known by its proponents as ‘Kokora’, the Bari word for ‘divide’ or ‘division’, and by its opponents as ‘Re-division’.

28 In practice, ‘Kokora’ meant the expulsion of non-Equatorians from government and civil service positions in the regional capital of Juba and elsewhere, and their reposting to their home regions. There had been no discussion among the proponents of ‘Kokora’ about retaining a pan-regional superstructure through which southerners could coordinate and protect their common interests.

29 Its manifesto was broadly Marxist in tone, but its analysis of the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was rooted in debates that pre-dated 1972.

30 With the overthrow of Nimeiri in April 1985, new, internal, southern Sudanese parties emerged, many with broad, national-sounding titles that in reality represented only provincial or even smaller constituencies.
in the country, leaving the Southern Region vulnerable to manipulation from the centre. As an agreement, its demise was proof of its weakness.

Throughout the period of Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government (1986-1989), more and more southern Sudanese leaders began to publicly agree with the SPLM/SPLA’s analysis, whatever doubts they had about the SPLA and its leader, John Garang. They began to speak in terms of a ‘nationalities question’, ‘the ruling clique’, and ‘uneven development’ throughout the Sudan. They also made a direct reference to the South’s first demand for federation in 1954 and its frustration as one of the causes of continued civil war.

By the beginning of 1989, there was a broad agreement between parties within Sudan that negotiations with the SPLM/SPLA should lead to a broad-based National Constitutional Conference, and it was to halt this that the National Islamic Front (NIF) coup of 30 June 1989 overthrew Sadiq al-Mahdi’s coalition government and ended negotiations. In the twenty year period between 1969 and 1989\(^{31}\), the idea of federalism had been effectively replaced nationally by policies of ‘decentralization’ and ‘regionalization’, where the central government retained its power in part by devolving its responsibility for providing services to the regions who, nevertheless, were denied the resources to bear the burden of that responsibility.

2.7. Political Ideology in Sudan

Erikson and Tedin (2003: 64) argue that ideology is a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.” What is important in Erikson’s and Tedin’s understanding of ideology is its role in structuring a society. Apartheid in South Africa or Social Democracy in Norway are prominent examples. In Sudan, Arabism and Islamism have been this structuring “set of beliefs.” Essentially, ideology is not just something people profess; it has practical utility and value commitment. For Parsons (1951), “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured.” Parson’s definition is similar to Erikson’s and Tedin’s definition above because “interpretation of the environment” is related to how ideology structures society. Eagleton (1991: 1)\(^{32}\), in one of his various definitions, argues that ideology is “a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class.” Like Eagleton, Pesqueux (2002: 2) states that ideology is a “system of ideas an individual or a social group holds over time to which they are committed.” Although the definitions offered by the above theorists can be applied to different types of ideologies, they have underlying similarities. In other words, the “body of ideas,” “set of beliefs,” “shared framework of mental models” and “system of ideas” all offer directives about ways in which society can order itself. In order to constitute a political ideology, these ideas, beliefs or mental models must be espoused meaningfully rather than superficially by a given social or political entity over a given period and for a certain objective.

2.7.1. The Problem of Ideology in Contemporary Africa

In Africa today, there is a dissonance between what leaders’ say they do and what they actually do. Since they are not accountable to their citizens, they can claim anything. The present section is meant to show that South Sudan is not alone when it comes to the problem of ideology and neither is it alone in terms of claiming something without the need to prove a claim with evidentiary support. So, undoubtedly, the lack of ideology (or its clarity) affects many African parties in their strategic visions and development goals (Bamikole 2012; Olanrewaju 2015; Fadakinte 2014), whether these parties are in power or in the opposition. Generally, there are two main problems with ideology in Africa. The first is a complete lack of ideology; the second the want of clarity in a professed ideology. This means that the politics of the country runs accountable to their citizens, they can claim anything. The present section is meant to show that South Sudan is not alone when it comes to the problem of ideology and neither is it alone in terms of claiming something without the need to prove a claim with evidentiary support. So, undoubtedly, the lack of ideology (or its clarity) affects many African parties in their strategic visions and development goals (Bamikole 2012; Olanrewaju 2015; Fadakinte 2014), whether these parties are in power or in the opposition. Generally, there are two main problems with ideology in Africa. The first is a complete lack of ideology; the second the want of clarity in a professed ideology. This means that the politics of the country runs according to the desires of leaders rather than a formalised ideological agenda and policy. In the latter case, there is usually an extant ideology, but its functions and value system are incoherent.

Kenyan coalitions and parties are formed on the basis of their leaders’ political needs, so politicians use tribes rather than sound ideological platforms to garner votes. Lack of ideological clarity and consistency is also an issue in Ethiopia: from centralised monarchism, to the MarxistLeninism of Mengistu (Takeuchi 2007), to the ethnic federalism and revolutionary democracy of Meles Zenawi (Adegehe 2009). Under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu’s Marxist-Leninism, Ethiopia was under a strong centralised governance structure and totalitarianism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Mengistu renounced communism in March 1990 (Walters 2009: 196) and embraced economic liberalisation (Nwase 1994). As The New York Times wrote on 22 May 1991, Mengistu had “moved to loosen restraints over the nation’s politics and economy” (Krauss 1991). It would be less than a year before the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted him. While Ethiopia is still facing political challenges, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has ushered in a seemingly promising era of political openness. This ideological confusion and lack of clarity is also evident in Uganda\(^{33}\).


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market and now teeters on military dictatorship (Mubangizi 2015) dressed in a liberal democracy suit. Museveni professes democratic openness but the political space in Uganda is small as shown by arbitrary arrests or the confinement of opposition figures such as Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (aka Bobi Wine) and Dr. Kizza Besigye. Ironically, Museveni (2000: 219) said in 1990, “We should not practice dictatorship under the guise of independence because independence does not and cannot mean dictatorship.”

South Sudan is now facing the same ideological problem. I hope the present essay will contribute to the debate and shed some light on the confusion about ideology, which crystallised within SPLM/A’s politicomilitary high Command (PMHC), now in SPLM Political Bureau value system, and other political parties in Africa. Essentially, claims need to be proven not just professed and expected to be accepted at face value.

2.7.2. The Fundamental Problem of the Sudan

To understand the genesis of the New Sudan Vision, it is important first to explain the knotty historical factors that necessitated its creation. Essentially, this north–south divide is traceable to the oppression Southern Sudanese endured from Arab slave merchants, the Ottoman rule (Turkiyya) and the Mahdi’s occupation (Mahdiyya)34 (Ronen 2002; Rolandsen and Daly 2016). Under the above oppressive regimes, the Africans in Sudan (north and south) lived a peripheral existence within the Sudanese society. Arguably, the Arabs and the European colonialists equated “blackness” with inferiority so “blackness” had “servile connotations” (Sharkey 2008: 21). In the global European context, the British colonialists considered Southern Sudanese inferior and geopolitically unimportant so they educated the Arabs and ignored the Africans. As Sharkey has argued, “the British cultivated a group of men [Arab Sudanese] who had the literacy and the political know-how to develop and articulate nationalist ideologies” (2008: 30). Judged religiously against Islam and culturally against Arabism, the Africans in Sudan, especially those in the South, were therefore administered with patronage as culturally inferior (Albino 1970; Yangu 1966)35. The Turks, Egyptians and the British considered Northerners superior to Southerners. As Mayo (1994: 166) has argued, “The Sudanese problems go far beyond the epoch of the European intrusion.” This is important to note because Arab Sudanese intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders argue that the racial and religious problems in Sudan started with the colonial policies, especially the “Southern Policy” (Mayo 1994; Rahim 1966). For many Northerners, the Africans in Sudan would have embraced Islam and adopt Arabism as their culture had the British not initiated the “Southern Policy.”

However, for Southerners, “Southern Policy” offered a relief against Arab disdain and slavery (Albino 1970; Mayo 1994; Yangu 1966)36. The policy also hinted at a possible separate “Negroid” nation state or Southern Sudan’s annexation to East Africa (Holt 1956: 370; Ronen 2002: 105). “The policy of the government in Southern Sudan,” said the policy, “is to build up a series of self-contained racial and tribal units with structure and organization based… upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs” (Albino 1970: 19). While there was a colonial and imperial intent disguised by the policy (Rahim 1966; Mayo 1994; Ronen 2002)37 in the assumed protectiveness of the policy against cultural and religious influence from the North, Southern Sudanese welcomed the policy as a safeguard against cultural influence and slavery. Unfortunately, the Anglo-Egyptian government in Sudan would ignore Southerners in administrative posts, education and development because of the above-mentioned attitude (Oduho and Deng 1963: 13). As Fabian Colonial Bureau wrote in 1947, “Educated Sudanese regard the South as Egypt regards them” (Oduho and Deng 1963: 17).

This “haste” to independence would widen the rift between Northerners and Southerners. During constitutional debates in 1951, 1956 and 1958, the Southerners request for a federal constitution was rejected (Alier 1990) in favour of a unitary Islamic constitution. In fact, Northerners would accept nothing short of an Islamic constitution from 1948 to the present day. As John Garang would argue decades later, “the problem is the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of the other parameters of the Sudanese diversity, as constituting the fundamental problem of the Sudan and defining the Sudanese conflict” (Kuka 2011). Joseph Lagu38, who signed an Agreement with the Sudanese government in 1972, said something similar after ratifying the Addis Ababa agreement. For Lagu, Southerners were not separatists (Beshir 1975).

34 Essentially, this north–south divide is traceable to the oppression Southern Sudanese endured from Arab slave merchants, the Ottoman rule (Turkiyya) and the Mahdi’s occupation (Mahdiyya)34 (Ronen 2002; Rolandsen and Daly 2016).

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political, economic, and social fields.” Lagu’s and Garang’s concerns are confirmed by Yangu (1966), who argues that “Social attitudes are far more important than laws in running the government.”

As independence neared, Southerners became increasingly wary. Azhari’s Sudanization39, which Southerners saw as an occupation of Southern Sudan (Yangu 1966), began after the self-government Act (Broadbent 1954) and gave most of the senior public service jobs in the South to Arab Sudanese instead of to Southern Sudanese. With no Southerners in the Sudanization Committee, only four junior positions, out of 800, went to Southerners (Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963; Yangu 1966). To Southerners, Sudanization was therefore a clear sociopolitical and socioeconomic signal that independence would only be a change of masters (Alier 1990; Yangu 1966). The fair deal (Johnson 2015) or safeguards (Albino 1970; Johnson 2015; Alier 1990) promised to Southerners disappeared after independence. For example, the Abboud government “would not tolerate politicians who uttered such evil word as federation” (Albino 1970). “Southerners,” Alier (1990) said, “either went to jail or chose a life in exile for supporting federal principles.”

2.8. The New Sudan Vision (NSV)
New Sudan, a reconfigured Sudan under an inclusive, new political dispensation, changed between 1983 and 199140, as we will see below. This made it confusing and Garang knew this. As he said in a 2004 speech in the US, “I am aware that the New Sudan has been criticized by some people in the past as utopian, that it is wishful thinking. This is because New Sudan has several dimensions” (Kuka 2011). Garang, of course, knew the deep-seated separatist sentiment among Southern Sudanese; however, he also knew that making separatism the rallying cry for the rights of Southern Sudanese would not win SPLM/A support, especially from Ethiopia (Johnson 2003; Nyaba 1997). In this regard, he appealed to Southerners by arguing that the unity of Sudan the SPLM/A was fighting for would be a unity on a new basis (Kuka 2011). As he put it in 2002 in London, “Why would I be interested in a United Sudan that discriminates me?” (Askou 2014). During the 1994 SPLM/A national convention, Garang (1994) warned against being a “self-styled Southern Separatist”; however, he acknowledged that “Some of them [separatists] are genuine.” A new strategy was therefore necessary. Moreover, this new strategy had to also appeal to Northerners (Arabs and Africans), the region, Africa, and the international community. The appeal to Northerners and the international community was meant to give the new Movement a global legitimacy. However, the appeal to Southern Sudanese was more important than the appeal to Northerners and the international community, because without the Southern fighting force, the SPLM/A would have been a mere political and linguistic game. Since Southern Sudanese had endured the brutality and marginalization of successive Arab regimes, as has been shown in the preceding section, Garang had to assuage their fears while making the SPLM appeal beyond the borders of Southern Sudan and Sudan as a whole.

Therefore, Garang and the SPLM/A41 leadership tried to balance this complex equation in the years leading up to the Bor Mutiny of 1983 and the founding of the SPLM/A. Garang was of course skeptical of the Addis Ababa agreement as mentioned above so, it was easy for him to exploit the Southern anxiety about Nimeiri’s capricious leadership. By September 1983, Nimeiri declared Sharia “the law of the land” (Sharkey 2008), divided the South into three administrative regions [Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal & Equatoria] and thereby unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement. For Southerners, it was a déjà vu all over again. Peaceful means of ensuring the rights and the dignity of the Southern Sudanese was no longer an option, again. Anyanya 2, made up of remnants of Anyanya 1 and some mutineers of 1975 (Akobo), 1976 (Wau), in 1977 (Juba) (Johnson 2016; Shinn 2004; Alier 1990) was already fighting Khartoum. John Garang, now a colonel in the Sudanese army, and other members of an underground movement (Madut-Arop 1987; Igga 2008), flocked to Ethiopia to unite the aggrieved Southern consciousness against Nimeiri. As Garang told Arop Madut-Arop, then the editor of Khartoum-based Heritage Newspaper, “We were not only in contacts, we were active … during the ten years between 1972–1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution” (Madut-Arop 1987)42.

When Garang and his army colleagues went to Ethiopia after the failure of the planned internal revolution (Leriche and Arnold 2013; Collins 2008; Scott 1984), they knew that uniting all Southern forces against Khartoum was a priority. According to Robert Collins (2008), these forces included defectors of battalions 104 and 105 as well as deserters from Anyanya 2 and other security services. Garang corroborated this in his interview with Madut-Arop: “Our immediate task after we formed the SPLM/SPLA was to try to regroup the scattered fighting forces that we found, politicise them, win their confidence and make them organic to the SPLA” (Madut-Arop 1987). Garang repeated this in 1994: “In the beginning it was necessary to unite all the various fighting guerrilla units in the Bush of Southern Sudan with insurgent forces of Battalions 104, 105…” (Garang 1994).

39 Azhari’s Sudanization, which Southerners saw as an occupation of Southern Sudan (Yangu 1966), began after the self-government Act (Broadbent 1954) and gave most of the senior public service jobs in the South to Arab Sudanese instead of to Southern Sudanese.

40 New Sudan, a reconfigured Sudan under an inclusive, new political dispensation, changed between 1983 and 1991, as we will see below.

41 Therefore, Garang and the SPLM/A leadership tried to balance this complex equation in the years leading up to the Bor Mutiny of 1983 and the founding of the SPLM/A. Garang was of course skeptical of the Addis Ababa agreement.

42 As Garang told Arop Madut-Arop, then the editor of Khartoum-based Heritage Newspaper, “We were not only in contacts, we were active … during the ten years between 1972–1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution” (Madut-Arop 1987).
Unfortunately, uniting these forces would not be easy as personal and ideological differences between unity and separatism collided. After the formation of the SPLM/A in 1983, older politicians like Akuot Atem de Mayen, Abdallah Chol and Gai Tut wanted the Movement to fight for an independent Southern Sudan (Nyabu 1997; Alier 1990; SPLM Manifesto 2008). Garang and his followers wanted to fight for a united, Socialist Sudan. Garang has always openly expressed his objection to secessionism as he emphasised to Madut Arrop (1987):

Whether Garang was a unionist or a separatist is open to debate because there are instances in which his separatism or unionism can be dismissed or supported. However, that he was an excellent strategist is unquestionable. Knowing that Mengistu was already fighting a separatist movement in Eritrea, Garang understood that the SPLM/A could not afford itself as separatist. In the end, Garang won as Mengistu supported a united, Secular and Socialist Sudan as this was in line with Mengistu’s domestic military plans and ideological base (Bayissa 2007). The July 1983 SPLM/A Manifesto was largely a polemical socialist propaganda in both its language and its content. It outlined what the SPLM/A was fighting for: a “socialist transformation” of Sudan (SPLM/A Manifesto 1983).

Notably, the manifesto is the only official ideological reference document of the SPLM/A. The SPLA Penal Code document (Malok 1990; SPLM 1994) instead, is a judicial not an ideological document. In lieu of any other official Movement’s ideological document, it is therefore reasonable to argue that the manifesto contains the Movement’s political ideology: socialism. As Malok (2009) has argued, the SPLM/A was a socialist Movement between 1983 and 1994. There has been doubts about the socialist claims of the SPLM/A since none of the top SPLM/A leaders was ideologically a confessed socialist before 1983 (Madut-Arop 2006). The Sudanese communist party, too, doubted SPLM/A socialist leaning in the manifesto (Madut-Arop 2006; Alier 1990). Nonetheless, the manifesto portrayed socialism as the structuring value system. Garang referred to the manifesto by waiving it up when speaking to conscripts from the Southern Blue Nile in the mid-1980s (SudaneseOnline 2012). He also referenced to it in his opening speech during the first SPLM/A National Convention (Garang 1994). In that convention speech, he argued that the objective as spelled out in the manifesto was “the complete destruction of the oppressive Jellaba regime.” He added that “Nothing can change this cardinal objective unless one means to surrender” (Garang 1994: 19). In his speech to the conscripts from the Southern Blue Nile, he reiterated that “We will not veer away from these goals/objectives” (SudaneseOnline 2012).

In the words of the Manifesto, the “cardinal” objective of the PLA “is … to establish a united Socialist Sudan, not a separate Southern Sudan.” Since “New Sudan” does not appear in the 1983 manifesto, it is this “united Socialist Sudan” that has become the “New Sudan” as chapter one of the First SPLM/A convention announced “the birth of New Sudan” (SPLM 1994: 1). Consequently, the establishment of this kind of “Sudan” would be the “Vision” of the SPLM/A. In social and political substance, principally, the New Sudan would be multiracial, multi-religious, multi-cultural and democratic. This is a Sudan “in which all nationalities and all the religious groups coexist” (Khalid 1992: 213). As Garang said in 2004 (Kuka 2011), it is “A New Sudan that belongs to all of us equally in which we are equally stakeholders.” As he told Novicki of Africa Report (1989), this “New Sudan” would be opposed to “a multi-nationality in which one of the nationalities poses and imposes itself as the only nationality with history and culture and goes to the absurd unnatural extent to force the other nationalities to convert.”

Undoubtedly, an inclusive “New Sudan” appealed to the marginalised people of Sudan (Malok 2009; Igga 2008). It experientially spoke to them as shown by a letter from Nuba people to the SPLM/A on 9 July 1992, arguing that the objectives of “united, democratic and secular Sudan … earned support of the Nuba people” (Nuba Mountains Solidarity Abroad 1992). This appeal was a result of the SPLA propaganda machinery since its inception (Scott 1984; Sharkey 2008; Malok 2009).

The evolution of the vision of a socialist Sudan over time made it even more confusing. As Dor (2016: 54) put it, “The New Sudan vision was both a political ideology and a method, as well as an objective of the struggle.” Garang (Askou100 2014) has reiterated this: “We have presented this vision as both a strategy, method, tactics of a struggle.” This certainly affects the coherence of NSV.

From the theoretical framework outlined above, I can say that NSV is a body of ideas and it has a method through which it was intended to restructure Sudan’s value system. As a result, I can answer the first question posed above in the affirmative: NSV was a [political] ideology. In addition, this ideology calls for an inclusive Sudan in which no single religion or ethnicity (or race) dominates. All social groups would share equally in governance, wealth and cultural expression. As Alfred Akuot said in 1984, people will “no longer be referred to as Northerners, Southerners, Easterners, or Westerners, but Sudanese” (Scott 1984: 72, emphasis in the original). Mayo concluded his article about the unity of Sudan under favourable conditions in the same manner: “everyone will call himself or herself Sudanese – no Arab Muslim, no African-Christian, but Sudan” (Mayo 1994: 1983, emphasis in original).

Given my preceding concession above that SPLM is a political ideology, I can agree with Athian, Deng and Thuch and Deng as quoted that the

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43 The SPLA Penal Code document (Malok 1990; SPLM 1994) instead, is a judicial not an ideological document.

44 In his speech to the conscripts from the Southern Blue Nile, he reiterated that “We will not veer away from these goals/objectives” (SudaneseOnline 2012).

45 This appeal was a result of the SPLA propaganda machinery since its inception (Scott 1984; Sharkey 2008; Malok 2009).
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement had a political ideology. But that is only part of the problem. While the New Sudan Vision was what Garang claimed as the core of what the SPLM/A was fighting for, it is still doubtful that NSV was incontrovertibly the full Movement’s ideology⁴⁶.

2.8.1. 1989–2005: Federation under the NIF

The NIF/military regime of Omar al-Bashir adopted the language of federalism to describe its own policy of decentralization. In the South, this was part of a strategy to isolate the SPLM/SPLA and manufacture an internal peace. The SPLM/SPLA had also wavered in its commitment to national restructuring and began to place more emphasis on self-determination as a solution.

Within the government-held areas of Sudan, southerners explored what sort of peace was possible in the context of the new political developments at the centre. Peter Cirillo, an ex-Anyanya soldier, a former governor of Equatoria, and a one-time energetic foe of the SPLA, addressed the September 1989 National Conference on Peace, convened by the new government in place of the proposed National Constitutional Conference. He showed surprising sympathy for the SPLM’s analysis of the causes of war, though his preferred solution—a federalism that fell short of reconstituting the former Southern Region—showed that he was still committed to the old regional politics. Other Equatorian leaders also adopted the language of ‘nationalities’ popularized by the SPLA; they argued for federalism as the logical extension of decentralization, also urging that the current consultation exercises should be no substitute for the aborted constitutional conference. But they, too, began to urge separation in the absence of any agreement over federalism with the north. Internal dissent within the SPLM/SPLA eventually led to a split. Ostensibly aimed at resolving the SPLM/SPLA internal contradictions, the breakaway movement of the Nasir commanders was founded on its own contradictions. Its declared objective was for the independence of the southern Sudan, but at its very inception it received military and political support from Khartoum—the very government from which it wanted to secede. The SPLM/SPLA⁴⁷ had already been preparing a new position on self-determination, signaling a major shift of position, and in September 1991 declared its priority of options:

- The position of the SPLM/SPLA on the system of Government shall be based on resolving the war through a united secular democratic Sudan, confederation, association of sovereign states or self-determination.
- The two factions of the SPLA remained bitterly hostile to each other on the battlefield, but outside Sudan attempted to reconcile their positions. At meetings in the Nigerian capital Abuja in 1992, and Washington DC in 1993, the two sides found a formula of words that tried to merge a national commitment with a more narrowly defined political solution for southern Sudan, and proclaimed support for self-determination not just for the South, but for Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile as well, all outside the administrative boundaries of the southern provinces but territories where the SPLA was also active.

With self-determination now the primary goal, federalism dropped out of the equation. Neither faction mentioned what form an interim government would take should peace be agreed with Khartoum or should south Sudan achieve independence. At the 1992 Abuja talks between the two factions, the SPLM/SPLA delegation was explicitly sceptical of the different terms then being discussed between the Nasir faction and Khartoum. Reading from the text prepared for him by other members of the delegation, William Nyuon Bany (then still a member of the mainstream SPLM/SPLA and the delegation’s leader), declared:

From this point on there were two separate strands of negotiation that eventually converged to produce the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), with all its own contradictions. The SPLM/SPLA negotiated with Khartoum through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)⁴⁸, and separately with the northern opposition parties, a series of agreements that combined the principle of a secular state for Sudan with the right of self-determination through a referendum for the south. The government in Khartoum negotiated a series of agreements with its southern allies, appearing to grant them the right to determine their constitutional future at some undetermined date and eventually creating a Coordinating Council for southern Sudan’s federal states in place of a single regional government. By 1999, however, it was clear from the implementation of these agreements that the Khartoum government’s version of federalism was highly centralized and the Coordinating Council had little real authority.

There were two main points of disagreement between many exiled southern Sudanese and the SPLM/SPLA’s leader, John Garang. The first was over the options to be voted on in self-determination; Garang wanted to define them in advance of a ceasefire and interim arrangements. He put forward three options of regional, federal, and confederal governments. Other political figures, such as Bona Malwal, suggested that the interim arrangements should be the alternative to independence, and that southerners would be asked to decide whether they would remain in the Sudan according to the way the government of the day in Khartoum was administering at the time of the referendum. The second point of

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disagreement was over who would be given the right of self-determination. Garang\textsuperscript{49} appeared to insist on including the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and elsewhere in the exercise of this right, at the same time as the south. Bona Malwal again articulated the opposition to this and insisted that a resolution for southern Sudanese should not be delayed by attempts to accommodate the other marginalized areas. Lam Akol, one of the former Nasir coup leaders who continued to lead his own movement based in the southern Shilluk territory, was quoted as dismissing the inclusion of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in southern self-determination as ‘preposterous paternalism’.

2.8.2. SPLM/A and the Question of Political Ideology

While John Garang as the Movement’s leader, the architect of the SPLM’s ideological and policy direction, and the main promoter of NSV seemed to have convinced South Sudanese and the SPLM leadership to embrace NSV\textsuperscript{50}, the facts shown below do not support such a conclusion. Even when Garang promoted the NSV over an independent South Sudan, he was not blind to the strong separatist sentiment and its rationale in the South given the history of oppression we encountered above. Gordon Muortat Mayen of the separatist Nile Provisional Government (NPG) was a staunch separatist (Gidron 2018); however, he welcomed Garang and his delegation to London in 2002 by saying that “on behalf of the new Sudan community in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, we welcome you and your delegation” (Askou100 2014, emphasis added). Like Southern separatism, Garang’s unionist stance has always been conditional on Khartoum’s attitude and on external, global realities (Malok 2009): [why] should I remain in a country where I am called abeed [slave]? No, I will not. But then let us take the bull by the horns and change the Sudan so that it belongs to all of us; so that it remains united. (Kuka 2011)\textsuperscript{51}.

Accordingly, a united Sudan under favourable sociopolitical conditions has always been Garang’s first choice in his Five-Model governance structure (Askou100 2014 [2002]; Deng 2013: 165). Nevertheless, for Southerners including some SPLM/A officials, a united Sudan under new conditions as Garang put it was acceptable. However, an independent nation state has always been the Southern first choice followed by federalism. The splits within the Movement in 1983 and 1991 concerned disagreements from liberation figures who saw “New Sudan” as a lofty ideal (Lam 2003: 306; Deng 2010). As Dor (2017: 54) succinctly put it, the NSV “created internal rifts within the leadership and amongst the southern populations concerned only with independence for Southern Sudan from the North.” However, on the surface, those who joined the SPLM/A seem to have accepted the idea of fighting for a united, changed Sudan. SPLA revolutionary songs were based on this total liberation of the Sudan.

In retrospect, SPLM/A publications such as SPLM/A Update and the radio SPLA can be reasonably rationalised as mouthpieces of Garang. As Malok (2009) and Nyaba (1997)\textsuperscript{52} have argued, the SPLM/A became synonymous with John Garang. However, their messages featured as the Movement’s revolutionary communications because they played the intended role of the Movement’s propaganda. So how can this be proven?

Collins and Daly (2016: 142) have argued that Garang “was the undisputed leader of SPLM/A, its chief ideologue, orator, decisionmaker, negotiator and diplomat.” Lam Akol and Riek Machar, in their “Nasir Declaration,” argued that Garang “is the director of Radio SPLA as well as its news director. Any contribution to the radio must be sanctioned by him personally” (Akol 2003: 308). While Machar’s and Akol’s claim sounds like an exaggeration, it is important to note that SPLA military and leadership directives were never critically discussed (see Kerubino’s letter in Igga 2008). Garang strategised and sent them “to all units.” There was no debate on his decisions and neither did he, in most cases, consult the High Command. Kerubino Kuanyin (Igga 2008), William Nyuon (Akol 2003) and Salva Kiir in 1987, 1992 and 2004, respectively, complained about how Garang ran the Movement without consulting them even when they were his second in command. Kiir’s criticism of Garang in Rumbek in 2004 is revealing: “When the Chairman leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left with; or does he carry it in his own brief case?” (Sudan Tribune 2008). During his plan to oust Garang, Nyuon called him a “monster” (Akol 2003: 135). Kerubino accused Garang in a 1987 letter that “the affairs of the Movement are being single handedly run by him [Garang]” (Igga 2008). I therefore find it reasonable to remain skeptical of the popular reception of the NSV among Southern Sudanese and SPLM/A officials\textsuperscript{53}.

\textsuperscript{49} Garang\textsuperscript{49} appeared to insist on including the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and elsewhere in the exercise of this right, at the same time as the south.

\textsuperscript{50} While John Garang as the Movement’s leader, the architect of the SPLM’s ideological and policy direction, and the main promoter of NSV seemed to have convinced South Sudanese and the SPLM leadership to embrace NSV\textsuperscript{50}, the facts shown below do not support such a conclusion.

\textsuperscript{51} Like Southern separatism, Garang’s unionist stance has always been conditional on Khartoum’s attitude and on external, global realities (Malok 2009): [why] should I remain in a country where I am called abeed [slave]? No, I will not. But then let us take the bull by the horns and change the Sudan so that it belongs to all of us; so that it remains united. (Kuka 2011).

\textsuperscript{52} In retrospect, SPLM/A publications such as SPLM/A Update and the radio SPLA can be reasonably rationalised as mouthpieces of Garang. As Malok (2009) and Nyaba (1997).

\textsuperscript{53} Kerubino accused Garang in a 1987 letter that “the affairs of the Movement are being single handedly run by him [Garang]” (Igga 2008). I therefore find it reasonable to remain skeptical of the popular reception of the NSV among Southern Sudanese and SPLM/A officials.
The SPLM, in its revised manifesto, and which for the first time included “the vision of New Sudan,” acknowledged these internal contradictions of the separatist-unionist dyad: “Some leaders of the SPLM [sic] and some Anya-Nya Commanders decided to leave the Movement because they wanted to fight for an independent Southern Sudan and not for a New Sudan” (SPLM Manifesto 2008).

With these internal differences and lack of free political debate within the SPLM/A, the acceptance of united Socialist Sudan and later the “New Sudan” were either out of fear or out of ignorance. Akol (2003), Nyaba (1997), Malok (2009) have highlighted this repressive politicomilitary culture in the SPLA prior to 1991. Thus, fighting for a united Sudan was a conditional acceptance of unionism by staunch separatists as a survivalist imperative. As Dor (2017) has argued, “New Sudan vision was not thereafter consistently shared by all in the Movement.” It is therefore reasonable to conclude that separatism remained latent. Essentially, NSV was not an ideal that had found a foothold among Southerners and in the SPLM/A. A majority of the SPLA infantry was not educated enough to understand the complexities of a “united socialist and secular Sudan” and those who understood it but wanted a separate Southern Sudan had to embrace it for expediency. However, that the NSV did rally Sudanese and more so, Southern Sudanese, is undeniable. Dor (2017) underscores this: “Unlike Anyanya the SPLM/A became a melting pot for all of Sudan and, for the first time, many different groups were able to identify with a shared national objective.”

Even though the core idea of “New Sudan” remained the same, many details changed and became complex between 1994 and 2005. The SPLM Manifesto (2008) noted this: “the vision itself has become more sharpened and enriched by the unfolding developments and events in the process.” NSV went from a simple sociopolitical and socioeconomic revolutionary concept for a nation state to a complex intellectual and futuristic utopia.

We have articulated the objective of the SPLM/SPLA in global terms in what we have termed the double apartheid political system of the Sudan and [the] establishment of a New Sudan. A new Sudanese political dispensation, that is based on the Sudanese reality as defined in the general mathematical equation of $S = (X, Y, Z)$ instead of the two parameters of Arabism and Islamism. (Askou 2014).

The vision of a New Sudan continued to grow in intellectual sophistication; however, Garang did not help the Movement’s leadership to grow intellectually with the vision. Until the 1994 SPLM/A convention in Chukudum, collective decision-making and free debate about SPLM/A policies and directives within the PMHC were not subject to debate. Garang dictated what happened in the Movement so the united Sudan or New Sudan was his imposition on the people. Some of those who rejected “New Sudan” where either killed or were forced to sign an agreement with Garang and involuntarily join the “New Sudan” slogan.

2.8.3. 2011 and After

In principle, Southern Sudanese rejected Khartoum’s version of federation when they voted for independence. In practice, they inherited Khartoum’s division of the South into ten states, with Juba replacing Khartoum as the central power: in other words, they inherited ‘decentralization’ rather than federation. Debates over the balance of powers between the central and state governments began with the drafting of the transitional constitution. Substantive calls for a federal system were made as early as 2011.

The debate over federalism in an independent South Sudan is now complicated by the fact that the armed opposition in the current political crisis precipitated by fighting in December 2013 has adopted ‘federalism’ as a political platform, while the government equates talk of federalism with subversion and disloyalty. But if we are to learn anything from the past history of southern Sudanese political thought, it is that federalism means many things. As the SPLM/SPLA warned at Abuja in 1992, ‘no system is federal merely because it claims to be federal’; the same term has been used to describe what are, in practice, highly centralized systems of government, as well as more radical projects of devolution that remain untried.

54 Akol (2003), Nyaba (1997), Malok (2009) have highlighted this repressive politicomilitary culture in the SPLA prior to 1991.

55 The SPLM Manifesto (2008) noted this: “the vision itself has become more sharpened and enriched by the unfolding developments and events in the process.” NSV went from a simple sociopolitical and socioeconomic revolutionary concept for a nation state to a complex intellectual and futuristic utopia.

56 In principle, Southern Sudanese rejected Khartoum’s version of federation when they voted for independence. In practice, they inherited Khartoum’s division of the South into ten states, with Juba replacing Khartoum as the central power: in other words, they inherited ‘decentralization’ rather than federation.

57 As the SPLM/SPLA warned at Abuja in 1992, ‘no system is federal merely because it claims to be federal’; the same term has been used to describe what are, in practice, highly centralized systems of government, as well as more radical projects of devolution that remain untried.
In Juba, there are some who now advocate a return to Kokora\textsuperscript{58} as the federal solution. A recent writer claims that the word is misunderstood and misrepresented. If that is so, it is not only because of the way some in the three Equatoria states are reviving anti-Dinka (or anti-Jien) propaganda in support of federalism, but because of the tribalist way the advocates of Kokora applied it at the beginning of the last civil war. Those of us who lived through Kokora—and were abruptly and brusquely told to leave our jobs and go back to our home regions—have every reason to be suspicious of the advocates of the new Kokora, especially after reading the comment sections on articles posted on such websites as the South Sudan News Agency and Sudan Tribune. Let us be clear: Kokora is not the same as federalism. It did not create a federal state in Equatoria or any place else in southern Sudan. It weakened the powers of the regions while leaving the power of the central government in Khartoum untouched, enhanced even. Those who want genuine federalism are best advised not to adopt Kokora as their model.

Currently the term ‘Ethnic Federalism\textsuperscript{59}’ has become a popular slogan, appearing to offer each community control of its own resources and affairs. Ethiopia is frequently presented as a model for ethnic federalism, yet Ethiopian federalism in practice also has been described as a means by which the ruling party has divided the opposition along ethnic lines, making it difficult for a united opposition to arise and challenge its power. The problem with Ethiopian federalism\textsuperscript{60} is not that it is insufficiently ethnic, but that it is insufficiently federal, and it is possible that its emphasis on ethnicity is the source of that weakness. Current proponents of ethnic federalism in South Sudan have proposed a number of federal states irrespective of current demography\textsuperscript{61} or economic viability. The SPLM-in-Opposition’s recent proposal of making 21 states along the 1956 boundaries of the South’s districts threatens to take the Ethiopian example to the extreme, creating weak states unable to challenge or restrain whoever holds power in the federal government.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Research Methodology
The section describe the research design, study population, sampling design, data collection and analysis that will be employed in the study survey.

3.1 Study Area
The study area of this research would South Sudan, Juba investigating Sudan People Liberation Movement party as a case study from 2005 – 2019. The research seek to gather information about the role of political parties in democratic transformation in South Sudan.

3.2 Research Sampling Design
Sampling design is the framework, or road map, that serves as the basis for the selection of a survey sample and affects many other important aspects of a survey as well or sampling design represents the population of interest, from which a sample is to be drawn. This study included the thirty (30) members of Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), 30 from other political parties and forty (40) beneficiaries in the Republic of South Sudan.

3.3 Research Design
Research Design refers to the overall strategy that you choose to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby, ensuring you will effectively address the research problem; it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. For the researcher to achieve the objective of the study, a combination of descriptive and cross-sectional research designs was considered to be the most appropriate. Cross sectional is one which studies a cross section of the population at a single point in time and data is collected at once. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and descriptive research design was used to describe the characteristics of the respondents under investigation.

\textsuperscript{58} In Juba, there are some who now advocate a return to Kokora\textsuperscript{58} as the federal solution. A recent writer claims that the word is misunderstood and misrepresented.

\textsuperscript{59} Currently the term ‘Ethnic Federalism\textsuperscript{59}’ has become a popular slogan, appearing to offer each community control of its own resources and affairs. Ethiopia is frequently presented as a model for ethnic federalism, yet Ethiopian federalism in practice also has been described as a means by which the ruling party has divided the opposition

\textsuperscript{60} The problem with Ethiopian federalism\textsuperscript{60} is not that it is insufficiently ethnic, but that it is insufficiently federal, and it is possible that its emphasis on ethnicity is the source of that weakness.

\textsuperscript{61} The SPLM-in-Opposition’s recent proposal of making 21 states along the 1956 boundaries of the South’s districts threatens to take the Ethiopian example to the extreme, creating weak states unable to challenge or restrain whoever holds power in the federal government.
3.2 Study population
Population is a subset of the target population and is also known as the study population. The accessible population is the population in research to which the researchers can apply their conclusions; it is from the accessible population that researchers draw their samples. The survey population that was researched on included; Technical staff (40), which comprised of Technocrats of SPLM Party, focal person, administrators like public relation officers, political experts and some support staff, twenty (20) beneficiaries of SPLM Party in the Republic of South Sudan.

3.3 Sampling techniques
Sampling technique is the way how data is collected from the field which can be inform of qualitative and quantitative methods for example instruments and methods used to collect quantitative data, quantitative research design: sampling and measurement. Purposive sampling method was used for elements which the researcher is interested in with vital information that has to be obtained from selected staff respondents. Simple random sampling method was used to ensure that each element in the study have equal chances to be included in the sample.

3.5 Sampling Size
Sampling size determination is the act of choosing the number of observation or replicates to include in a statistical sample. The samples size an important feature of any empirical study in which the goals is to make inferences about a population from a sample. A simple size of 50 respondents was selected by Mohegan table considering the time factor and other related constraints to give information needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>Study population</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public relations officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Activists</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other political parties</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General public</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6 Source of Data

3.6.1 Primary data
Primary data is where the data is collected using methods such as interviews and questionnaires, they are many methods of collecting primary data observed or collected directly from first-hand experience. The data from primary was particularly from direct interviews and questionnaires as key data collection tools. This will involve data from the field where the researcher will interact with the respondents and collect firsthand information. This will help the researcher to obtained data that will be used for findings of the study which are discussed to draw final conclusions and research recommendations.

3.6.2 Secondary data
Secondary data refers to data that was collected by someone other than the user. Common sources of secondary data for social science club include censuses, information collected by the government department, organizational records and data that was originally collected for other research purpose. The data was from both internal and external. The researcher will obtained data that was already written about the topic under study. This will help to review the literature review of the study and help the researcher to cite areas of agreement and disagreements that authors have and how such existing gaps could be filled by research. Internal data was from party members, technocrats and political analysts of SPLM Party.

3.7 Data Collection Instruments
Data collection instruments it refers to as a device used to collect used to collect the data to facilitate variable observation and measurement. Data was basically collected using two major instruments that are interview and questionnaires.

3.7.1 Interviews
An interview is the verbal conversation between two people with the objective of collecting relevant information for the purpose of research. Both structured and non-structured interview techniques will be used to gather key data from respondents and key informants. The interviews will be based on a guide that has a checklist of questions for individuals who will provide vital information and the only way to get it will be through interviewing especially getting information from those who are employed among community members since researcher sees them as potential information providers.
to the study. This method will be used because of the detailed information that is ought to be provided about the subject of study.

3.7.2 Questionnaires
A questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. Although they are often designed for statistical analysis of the response, this is not always the case. Open ended questionnaires were designed and sent to respondents to be filled in.

3.8 Data processing, Analysis and Presentation
Data processing, analysis and presentation involves collecting or adding to the data holdings. They are several methods of acquiring data: collecting new data. Using your own previously collected data. Data collected was reduced and summarized to bring out the desired features of the study. Processing was based on editing (was used to client errors and omissions to ensure accuracy and consistency). Coding was used to classify the responses into meaningful data and tabulations using SPSS and Ms. Excel.

3.9 Validity and Reliability of Data
The questionnaires were made simple and easy so as to be clearly understood by the respondents. The researcher was available to make necessary explanation on the questions where there is need. At least retest was milled out. The questionnaire were distributed on a second occasion, it was observed that the degree of consistency was quite high. This shows that the questionnaire is reliable.

3.10 Ethical Consideration
The researcher ensured that all citations and references of different authors were acknowledged. The researcher maintained confidentiality of the respondents and protect their privacy at all times. The researcher will carry out full knowledge and authority of SPLM Party in the Republic of South Sudan. Assurance of the confidentiality will be exhibited in the critical process of collecting and coding data, better still objectivity as principle of research will be paramount to control of bias and distortion.

3.11 Limitations of the Study
Failure to respond to certain questions and providing false information will be a limitation to the study. This was due to fear by some respondents that the researcher will exposed their economic development challenges to the public as they are the engines of the economy. However the researcher used logical questions such that they will be able to release information needed by the researcher.

The study is limited by inadequate finance as it will be costly in terms of movement and buying of materials to use. Here, the researcher will try to mobilize for more funds by soliciting funds from sponsors. There is also a problem of some respondent’s failure to give out their views and also fill the questionnaires. Here, the researcher will supplement this information by carrying out face to face interviews. The study will be limited by time because there were a lot of activities that have to be done which at times may create a lot of fatigue for the researcher. Here, the researcher may need to hire research assistants to help him during the course of data collection.

The researcher may also face the challenge of language barrier as many of the respondents may not speak the same language as he does. Here, the researcher will acquire the services of interpreters to enable him communicate effectively with his respondents.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND PRESENTATION
4.0 Introduction
This chapter comprises of Data analysis, Interpretation and Presentation of results on ‘Development of political though in South Sudan’. The analysis was made on 48 respondents where results of the finding were presented through tabulation, pie chart and graphs.

Table 4.1: Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021

Volume-7 | Issue-1 | Jan, 2022

138
It has shown in figure 4.1 that males were the leading with an average of 77.1% participations in this study compare to females who made up 22.9% of the respondents.

Table 4.2: Age of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-above</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
According to age specification in figure 4.2 results, 47.9% were those whose ages ranged from 26 to 30 years old, followed by 18 to 25 years old age group with 35.4% while those whose ages ranged from 31-40 years old made up 10.4%. As majority were those whose ages fall under 26 to 30 years age set, 41 year and above respondents constituted minor portion of 6.3% only.

Table 4.3: Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>separated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021

Figure 4.3: Marital status

As the respondents were ask to indicated their marital status in figure 4.3 above, 70.8% were singles, 25% were married and 2.1% equally constituted those who separated and other marital status. Single status is the leading among other marital status, meaning that majority of the respondents were unmarried people.

Table 4.4: Last Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Table 4.4: Last Educational level

The last educational level of which majority of the respondents had acquired was Degree with an average of 70.8%, while Secondary, Masters and other academic level constituted equal share of 8.3% respectively. Those who acquired technical skill were the minority among others participants with an average of 4.2% projecting Degree to be the leading educational level according to this finding results.

Table 5.5: Place of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
In regards to working place of the respondents in figure 5.5, those who were working in others apart from government, NGOs, Private sectors made high portion of 54.2%, private sectors workers constituted 22.9%, government employees made up 20.8% and NGOs staffs were the minority with an average of 2.1%. This mean that majority of the respondents were those who engaged in other categories of work.

**Table 4.6: Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
The students occupied leading average of respondents with 64.6% participations, civil servants with 20.8%, other occupations made up 12.5% and business owners constituted less portion of 2.1% of the respondents. Based on the finding results, students have contributed positively more than other people who participated in this study.

Table 4.7: State of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Upper Nile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Equatoria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
As the respondents were asked to specify their states of origin in Figure 4.7, Greater Bahr el Ghazal natives were the leading with an average of 45.8%, followed by those of greater Equatoria with 33.3% while 16.7% were from greater Upper Nile region. The 4.2% minority of the respondents were from Abyei administrative Area. In accordance to results of the finding, most of the participants were from Greater Bahr el Ghazal by origin where Bahr el Ghazal has become the leading region among others regions.

Table 4.8: Does the current government of TGoNU encourage the development of political thought?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Most of the participants who responded ‘Yes’ constituted lion share of 72.9% while those who said ‘No’ that the current government of TGoNU does not encourage the development of political thought made up 27.1% of the respondents. According to majority point of views, the current government of TGoNU has been playing a significant role in encouraging the development of political thought in the country.

Table 4.9: Do the current political parties support the development of politics though in the country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021

According to the finding results in figure 9, 62.5% said ‘Yes’ the current political parties support the development of politics though in the country while 37.5% presents those who opposed the statement due to their own perception of the current political parties’ activities.

Table 4.10: Do you think the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice in support of political thought?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Figure 4.10: Do you think the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice in support of political thought?

It was shown that 87.5% majority of participants responded ‘Yes’ they think the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice in support of political thought however, 12.5% among participants said ‘No’. The statement is proven to correct by majority of the respondents who have agreed with it.

Table 4.11: Is there a realistic opportunity for the political parties in south Sudan to build the political ideology?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
It has shown that 52.1% said ‘No’, there is no a realistic opportunity for the political parties in South Sudan to build the political ideology while 47.9% of participants responded ‘Yes’ there is a space for political parties to establish political ideology. Based on the finding results, majority of the respondents were politically frustrated and hence they don’t see any ground of establishing a beneficial political ideology due poor political ideals developed in the country.

Table 4.12: Are the people's political choices free from domination by the ethnicity military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Percent</th>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Figure 4.12: Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the ethnicity military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable?

The 52.1% disputed statement and said ‘No’ while 47.9% agreed with statement that people’s political choices are free from domination by the ethnicity military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable. In regards to this finding, the political expression and freedom of joining parties were not independent compare to other countries in the world.

Table 4.13: Do people elect head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
It is stressed out by 52.1% of the respondents that people do not elect head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government. However, those who said ‘Yes’ that people have rights to elect their representatives and head of state. But the fact is that majority of the respondents pointed out that government formation is out of their knowledge because they are not involved in nomination process of the leaders.

**Table 4.14: Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>52.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Figure 4.14: Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or trip the political balance in favor of another group?

According to finding results in figure 4.14, 52.1% have responded ‘Yes’, the government or occupying power is deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or trip the political balance in favor of another group while 47.9% constituted number of the respondents who said ‘No’, government is not changing the ethnic composition of a country in an forms.

Table 4.15: Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
The finding results in figure 4.15 indicated that 52.1% of participants disagreed with statement that there is no academic freedom and the educational system is not free from extensive political indoctrination while 47.9% made up those who said ‘Yes’ there is academic freedom and educational system is totally free from political exploitations. In accordance to respondents’ views, there is no academic freedom and fair educational system in the country.

Table 4.16: Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Figure 4.16: Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?

In regards to freedom of self-expression, 60.4% of the respondents said ‘No’, individuals are not free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution however, 39.6% said ‘Yes’ there is freedom of expressions in the country and individuals are allowed to express their personal views without threats or fear of government. Despite of that, the truth remains the same that there is no freedom of expression and personal views are sidelined by government in all affairs and activities of the country.

Table 4.17: Are the people of south Sudan can play a role to strengthening political competition in the country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
According to results in figure 4.17, those who said ‘Yes’ that the people of south Sudan can play a role to strengthening political competition in the country constituted 83.3% while those who have disagreed with statement made up 16.7% of the respondents. It is clear that the people of South Sudan can play significant roles to strengthen and create a conducive political atmosphere in the country where competition is based on merits and objectives of the party.

Table 4.18: Is political ideology in South Sudan is develop than the past?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Figure 4.18: Is political ideology in South Sudan is develop than the past?

It has shown that 52.1% said ‘No’ political ideology in South Sudan is not has never developed than past years while 47.9% of the respondents have presented their views that there political ideological reform compare to pervious years in South Sudan but the fact remains the same that majority of participants said there is no any political development.

Table 4.19: There are no positive impacts of developing political thought in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
The statement that there are no positive impacts of developing political though in South Sudan was agreed by 39.6%, 25% strongly disagreed, 20.8% disagreed, 8.3% strongly agree and 6.3% were those who were not sure respectively. In accordance to majority, there are positive impacts of developing political though in the country because it shape political understanding of modern ideological reforms.

Table 4.20: Political parties have no contribution to nation development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
According to the finding results in figure 4.20, the statement that political has not contribution to nation development was agreed and disagreed respectively by 29.2% of the respondents while those who strongly agreed and those who disagreed with statement constitute equal share of 16.7% and 8.3% made up number of the respondents who were not sure. In fact, political parties have significant contributions to nation development when they are performing at faithful will however, they got no contributions when they are monopolized by individuals to operate at personal interests.

**Table 4.21: There are no internal factors influencing the development of political thought in South Sudan.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Valid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>70.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>77.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
Figure 4.21: There are no internal factors influencing the development of political thought in South Sudan.

The statement that there are no internal factors influencing the development of political thought in South Sudan was disagreed by 41.7%, 29.2% agreed with statement, 18.8% strongly disagree and those who strongly agreed with statement made up 6.3% respectively. While 4.2% among participants were neutral because they were not sure with statement. This mean there are internal factors influencing and hindering development of political thought in South Sudan.

Table 4.22: Government has no way of improving the needs of political parties in the pursuance of political development and thought in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021

Figure 4.22: Government has no way of improving the needs of political parties in the pursuance of political development and thought in the country.
The finding results in figure 4.22 show that 29.2% were those who agree with statement that government has no way of improving the needs of political parties in the pursuance of political development and thought in the country, 22.9% disagreed, 18.8% equally presents number of respondents who strongly agree and those who strongly disagreed with statement respectively. However, 10.4% remains as number of respondents who were not sure with statement and so they decided to be neutral. As per the results, there is an indication that majority of participation have agreed accordingly with statement, meaning that government has failed to improve needs of political parties in the country.

Table 4.23: There are positive and significant contribution of political thought in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>62.5</td>
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<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>81.3</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021

In regards to statement that there are positive and significant contribution of political thought in South Sudan, 47.9% agreed with statement, 18.8% strongly agreed and 14.6% constituted number of respondents who disagreed with statement. The statement has been strongly disputed by 10.4% and 8.3% were not sure with statement. It is implied that there are positive and significant impacts of political thought in nation building.

Table 4.24: There is significance relationship between political thought and political development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021
According to finding results in figure 4.24, 47.9% of the respondents agreed and emphasized that there is significant relationship between political thought and political development, 29.2% constituted number of participants who strongly agreed with statement while 8.3% made up number of respondents who disagreed and those who were not sure respectively. However, the statement was strongly disagree by 6.3% of participants. This mean there is a strongly relationship between political thought and political development.

Table 25: There are factors preventing political parties on enhancing the development of political thought in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data (Questionnaires) 2021

It has implied in figure 4.25 results that 45.8% of the respondents were agreed with statement that there are factors preventing political parties on enhancing the development of political thought in South Sudan and the same statement was strongly agree by 25% of participants. While 10.4% equal constituted portion of those who strongly disagree and those
who were not sure with statement. And 8.3% of the respondents disagreed with statement however, the results implied that there are factors hindering political parties on enhancing the development of political thought in South Sudan.

4.26: What are the factors affecting Political thought development in South Sudan?
According to finding results, the factors which are affecting political thought development in South Sudan are:
- Absence of democracy in the country,
- Lack of ideology and political training centers
- Lack of clear visions and objectives,
- Unseparated powers of military and political party in the country
- Poor education and lack of leadership skills,
- Lack of the freedom of expression and criticism,
- Ethnicity political concepts and lack of unified political ideals,
- Power greediness and lack of diversity and equality for all party members,
- Political misunderstanding among the parties,
- Lack of accountability and rule of laws in the country,

4.27: What are the environment factors affecting the role of political parties in ensuring political thought?
- High rate of illiteracy in the country,
- Insecurities among the societies,
- Lack of political rights in the country,
- Poor democratic process
- Lack of political ideas and political will between leaders,
- Lack of proper political training,
- Ethnic organization and lack of nationalism

4.28: What are the roles of political parties in enhancing political thought in South Sudan?
The political parties can play the follow roles to enhance political thought in the country,
- Massive Political sensitization about the important of political parties,
- Development of unified political ideologies which are free from ethnicities,
- Organization of party’s seminar, conference and other beneficial way which can bring party members under one umbrella,
- To established democratic system of free and fair political competitions,
- Political parties should be allow to express themselves and affairs,

4.29: Are there importance of political thought development in the country?
Yes, there are importance of political though development such as training and preparing young politicians, helps in developing an inclusive political party, promoting democracy, bridging ethnicities gaps and educating nation on the modern political ideas and development. Political thought development is very significant important because it shapes and transform the image of the country through bringing together different political ideas and demonstration of visions in action as method of overcoming each other politically.

4.30: What are the roles foreign policy on political thought?
The roles of foreign policy on political thought are as follows;
- Promoting democratic governance through engaging the ruling party into consensus with other opposition parties in the country,
- Assist government financially when there is financial gaps in the country,
- Provide humanitarian assistance to the needed people in the country,
- Reconcile and mediate political difference of the parties,
- Provision of accountability ground through monitoring of government spending and utilization of public resources of the country,
- Engaged domestic politicians to use peaceful way of resolving political misunderstanding,

4.31: At your personal point of view, what suggestion can you make regarding political parties’ roles in democratic transformation in South Sudan?
The common views given by participants in this research in regards to political parties’ roles in democratic transformation in South Sudan are as below mentioned;
- The political parties should geared towards promoting democracy in the country,
- The political parties should act and operate under supreme constitution of the states,
- Political parties should create awareness on the importance of political organization in order to eradicate ethnicity concepts being adopted as political ideology due to poor political awareness,
- They should pressure government on services delivery and how public resources are being handled by the government,
• There should advocate for common goals of the people but not at the basis of political interests and accommodations,
• Political parties should provide political training to youths and women and oriented them on good leadership.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY
5.0. Introduction
This chapter contains summary of the findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study on ‘Development of political thought in South Sudan’.

5.1. Summary of the findings
The summary has been divided into two parts; Bio-Data of the respondents and Summary of the finding on topic of the study.

5.1.1. Background of the respondents.
It has shown that males were the leading with an average of 77.1% participations in this study compare to females who made up 22.9% of the respondents. And 47.9% were those whose ages ranged from 26 to 30 years old, followed by 18 to 25 years old age group with 35.4% while those whose ages ranged from 31-40 years old made up 10.4%. As majority were those whose ages fall under 26 to 30 years age set, 41 year and above respondents constituted minor portion of 6.3% only.
As the respondents were ask to indicate their marital status, 70.8% were singles, 25% were married and 2.1% equally constituted those who separated and other marital status. Single status is the leading among other marital status, meaning that majority of the respondents were unmarried people.
The last educational level of which majority of the respondents had acquired was Degree with an average of 70.8%, while Secondary, Masters and other academic level constituted equal share of 8.3% respectively. Those who acquired technical skill were the minority among others participants with an average of 4.2% projecting Degree to be the leading educational level according to this finding results. However, those who were working in others apart from government, NGOs, Private sectors made high portion of 54.2%, private sectors workers constituted 22.9%, government employees made up 20.8% and POS staffs were the minority with an average of 2.1%. This mean that majority of the respondents were those who engaged in other categories of work.
The students occupied leading average of respondents with 64.6% participations, civil servants with 20.8%, other occupations made up 12.5% and business owners constituted less portion of 2.1% of the respondents. Based on the finding results, students have contributed positively more than other people who participated in this study.
The Greater Bahr el Ghazal natives were the leading with an average of 45.8% participations, followed by those of greater Equatoria with 33.3% while 16.7% were from greater Upper Nile region. The 4.2% minority of the respondents were from Abyei administrative Area. In accordance to results of the finding, most of the participants were from Greater Bahr el Ghazal by origin where Bahr el Ghazal has become the leading region among others regions.

5.1.2. Summary of the finding results on ‘Development of political thought in South Sudan’.
Most of the participants who responded ‘Yes’ constituted lion share of 72.9% while those who said ‘No’ that the current government of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) does not encourage the development of political thought made up 27.1% of the respondents. According to majority point of views, the current government of TGoNU has been playing a significant roles in encouraging the development of political thought in the country. And according to results, 62.5% said ‘Yes’ the current political parties support the development of polities though in the country while 37.5% presents those who opposed the statement due to their owns perception of the current political parties’ activities this concurred with sultan Yosa Wawa who said in a conference that political parties support the development of political policies
It was shown that 87.5% majority of participants responded ‘Yes’ they think the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice in support of political thought however, 12.5% among participants said ‘No’. The statement is proven to correct by majority of the respondents who have agreed with it. In other hand, 52.1% said ‘No’, there is no a realistic opportunity for the political parties in South Sudan to build the political ideology while 47.9% of participants responded ‘Yes’ there is a space for political parties to establish political ideology. Based on the finding results, majority of the respondents were politically frustrated and hence they don’t see any ground of establishing a beneficial political ideology due poor political ideals developed in the country.
The 52.1% disputed statement and said ‘No’ while 47.9% agreed with statement that people’s political choices are free from domination by the ethnicity military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable. In regards to this finding, the political expression and freedom of joining parties were not independent compare to other countries in the world.
It is traced out by 52.1% of the respondents that people do not elect head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government. However, those who said ‘Yes’ that people have rights to elect their representatives and head of state. But the fact is that majority of the respondents pointed out that government formation is out of their knowledge because they are not involved in nomination process of the leaders.
According to finding results, 52.1% have responded ‘Yes’, the government or occupying power is deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or trip the political balance in favor of another group while 47.9% constituted number of the respondents who said ‘No’, government is not changing the ethnic composition of a country in an forms this is agreement to Douglas H. (2013). And it is indicated that 52.1% of participants disagreed with statement that there is no academic freedom and educational system is free from extensive political indoctrination while 47.9% made up those who said ‘Yes’ there is academic freedom and educational system is totally free from political exploitations. In accordance to respondents’ views, there is no academic freedom and fair educational system in the country.

In regards to freedom of self-expression, 60.4% of the respondents said ‘No’, individuals are not free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution however, 39.6% said ‘Yes’ there is freedom of expressions in the country and individuals are allowed to express their personal views without threats or fear of government. Despite of that, the truth remains the same that there is no freedom of expression and personal views are sidelined by government in all affairs and activities of the country.

According to results, those who said ‘Yes’ that the people of south Sudan can play a role to strengthening political competition in the country constituted 83.3% while those who have disagreed with statement made up 16.7% of the respondents. It is clear that the people of South Sudan can play significant roles to strengthen and create a conducive political atmosphere in the country where competition is based on merits and objectives of the party this is line with Adwok Peter (1997)which stated that the country can greatly impact a conducive environment for political development.

It has shown that 52.1% said ‘No’ political ideology in South Sudan has never developed than past years while 47.9% of the respondents have presented their views that there political ideological reform compare to pervious years in South Sudan but the fact remains the same that majority of participants said there is no any political development which contradict with Lam Akol (1997) findings.

The statement that there are no positive impacts of developing political though in South Sudan was agreed by 39.6%, 25% strongly disagreed, 20.8% disagreed, 8.3% strongly agree and 6.3% were those who were not sure respectively. In accordance to majority, there are positive impacts of developing political though in the country because it shape political understanding of modern ideological reforms.

The statement that political has no contribution to nation development was agreed and disagreed respectively by 29.2% of the respondents while those who strongly agreed and those who disagreed with statement constitute equal share of 16.7% and 8.3% made up number of the respondents who were not sure. In fact, political parties have significant contributions to nation development when they are performing at faithful will however, they got no contributions when they are monopolized by individuals to operate at personal interests this was in contradicion to Douglas H. (2013). However, the statement that there are no internal factors influencing the development of political thought in South Sudan was disagreed by 41.7%, 29.2% agreed with statement, 18.8% strongly disagree and those who strongly agreed with statement made up 6.3% respectively. While 4.2% among participants were neutral because they were not sure with statement. This mean there are internal factors influencing and hindering development of political thought in South Sudan this concurred with Cirillo Peter (2005) findings.

It is implied that 29.2% were those who agree with statement that government has no way of improving the needs of political parties in the pursuance of political development and thought in the country, 22.9% disagreed, 18.8% equally presents number of respondents who strongly agree and those who strongly disagreed with statement respectively. However, 10.4% remains as number of respondents who were not sure with statement and so they decided to be neutral. As per the results, there is an indication that majority of participation have agreed accordingly with statement, meaning that government has failed to improve needs of political parties in the country.

In regards to statement that there are positive and significant contribution of political thought in South Sudan, 47.9% agreed with statement, 18.8% strongly agreed and 14.6% constituted number of respondents who disagreed with statement. The statement has been strongly disputed by 10.4% and 8.3% were not sure with statement. It is implied that there are positive and significant impacts of political thought in nation building this is in agreement with Agolong, A.C et al 1976 findings which state that political development can increase the development of political thought and political development as well.

It was indicate that 47.9% of the respondents agreed and emphasized that there is significant relationship between political thought and political development, 29.2% constituted number of participants who strongly agreed with statement while 8.3% made up number of respondents who disagreed and those who were not sure respectively. However, the statement was strongly disagree by 6.3% of participants. This mean there is a strongly relationship between political thought and political development. In other regards, 45.8% of the respondents agreed with statement that there are factors preventing political parties on enhancing the development of political thought in South Sudan and the same statement was strongly agree by 25% of participants. This concurred with Lino Wuor (2014) finding which stated that there is significant relationship between political thought and political development. While 10.4% equal constituted portion of those who strongly disagreed and those who were not sure with statement. And 8.3% of the respondents disagreed with statement however, the results implied that there are factors hindering political parties on enhancing the development of political though in South Sudan. According to finding results, the factors which are affecting political thought development in South Sudan are;

- Absence of democracy in the country,
- Lack of ideology and political training centers,
- Lack of clear visons and objectives,
Unseparated powers of military and political party in the country
Poor education and lack of leadership skills,
Lack of the freedom of expression and criticism,
Ethnicity political concepts and lack of unified political ideals,
Power greediness and lack of diversity and equality for all party members,
Political misunderstanding among the parties,
Lack of accountability and rule of laws in the country,

The environment factors affecting the role of political parties in ensuring political thought according to respondents’ views were included the following:

- High rate of illiteracy in the country,
- Insecurities among the societies,
- Lack of political rights in the country,
- Poor democratic process
- Lack of political ideas and political will between leaders,
- Lack of proper political training,
- Ethnic organization and lack of nationalism

The political parties can play the follow roles to enhance political thought in the country,
- Massive Political sensitization about the important of political parties,
- Development of unified political ideologies which are free from ethnicities,
- Organization of party’s seminar, conference and other beneficial way which can bring party members under one umbrella,
- To established democratic system of free and fair political competitions,
- Political parties should be allow to express themselves and affairs,

Besides that, there are importance of political though development such as training and preparing young politicians, helps in developing an inclusive political party, promoting democracy, bridging ethnicities gaps and educating nation on the modern political ideas and development.

Political thought development is very significant important because it shapes and transform the image of the country through bringing together different political ideas and demonstration of visions in action as method of overcoming each other politically.

As the foreign relation is one of the main element which can helps governments in its affairs through foreign intervene, the roles of foreign policy on political thought were scale as follows;

- Promoting democratic governance through engaging the ruling party into consensus with other opposition parties in the country,
- Assist government financially when there is financial gaps in the country,
- Provide humanitarians assistance to the needed people in the country,
- Reconcile and mediate political difference of the parties,
- Provision of accountability ground through monitoring of government spending and utilization of public resources of the country,

Engaged domestic politicians to use peaceful way of resolving political misunderstanding. And finally, the common views given by participants in this research in regards to political parties’ roles in democratic transformation in South Sudan are as below mentioned;

- The political parties should geared towards promoting democracy in the country,
- The political parties should act and operate under supreme constitution of the states,
- Political parties should create awareness on the importance of political organization in order to eradicate ethnicity concepts being adopted as political ideology due to poor political awareness,
- They should pressure government on services delivery and how public resources are being handled by the government,
- There should advocate for common goals of the people but not at the basis of political interests and accommodations.
- Political parties should provide political training to youths and women and oriented them on good leadership.

5.2 Conclusion

According to the finding results and respondents views, the majority of the respondents acknowledged the efforts current government of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) especially in encourage the development of political thought in the country. Because the current government is collation of different political parties brought together by peace agreement to serve for the scope term specified by agreement, this concurred with Jack Lino Wuor (2014) which stated that to implement peace successfully, there is need to establish a government of national unity under decentralization.

It was emphasized that people have rights to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice in support of political thought without interference of government. And as the result, it was reveal that the political expression and freedom of joining parties is not free in South Sudan compare to other countries in the world because people do not elect head of government and national legislative representatives to determine the policies of the government.

Despite of that, the results implied that the government or occupying power is deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or trip the political balance in favor of another group. And
according to respondents’ views, there is no academic freedom and fair educational system, no freedom of expression and personal views are sidelined by government in all affairs and activities of the country. However, majority of the respondents believed that the people of South Sudan can play significant roles to strengthen and create a conducive political atmosphere in the country where competition is based on merits and objectives of the party, because there are positive impacts of developing political thought in South Sudan. In fact, political parties have significant contributions to nation development when they are performing at faithful will however, they got no contributions when they are monopolized by individuals to operate at personal interests.

In other hand, the finding stressed out that there are internal factors influencing and hindering development of political thought in South Sudan and the government has no way of improving the needs of political parties in the pursuance of political development because there are positive and significant impacts of political thought in nation building. Therefore, there is a strongly relationship between political thought and political development.

According to finding results, the factors which are affecting political thought development in South Sudan are, absence of democracy in the country, lack of ideology and political training centers, lack of clear visons and objectives, unseparated powers of military and political party in the country, poor education and lack of leadership skills, lack of the freedom of expression and criticism, ethnicity political concepts and lack of unified political ideals, power greediness and lack of diversity and equality for all party members, political misunderstanding among the parties, lack of accountability and poor execution of rule of laws in the country.

The environment factors affecting the role of political parties in ensuring political thought according to respondents’ views were includes the following:
- High rate of illiteracy in the country,
- Insecurities among the societies and lack of political rights in the country,
- Poor democratic process and lack of political ideas and political will between leaders,
- Lack of proper political training,
- Ethnic organization and lack of nationalism
- The political parties can play the follow roles to enhance political thought in the country,
  - Massive Political sensitization about the important of political parties,
  - Development of unified political ideologies which are free from ethnicities,
  - Organization of party’s seminar, conference and other beneficial way which can bring party members under one umbrella,
  - To established democratic system of free and fair political competitions,
  - Political parties should be allow to express themselves and affairs,

Besides that, there are importance of political though development such as training and preparing young politicians, helps in developing an inclusive political party, promoting democracy, bridging ethnicities gaps and educating nation on the modern political ideas and development.

Political thought development is very significant important because it shapes and transform the image of the country through bringing together different political ideas and demonstration of visions in action as method of overcoming each other politically.

As the foreign relation is one of the main element which can helps governments in its affairs through foreign intervene, the roles of foreign policy on political thought were scale as follows;
- Promoting democratic governance through engaging the ruling party into consensus with other opposition parties in the country,
- Assist government financially when there is financial gaps in the country,
- Provide humanitarians assistance to the needed people in the country,
- Reconcile and mediate political difference of the parties,
- Provision of accountability ground through monitoring of government spending and utilization of public resources of the country,
- Engaged domestic politicians to use peaceful way of resolving political misunderstanding. And finally, the common views given by participants in this research in regards to political parties’ roles in democratic transformation in South Sudan are as below mentioned;
  - The political parties should geared towards promoting democracy in the country,
  - The political parties should act and operate under supreme constitution of the states,
  - Political parties should create awareness on the importance of political organization in order to eradicate ethnicity concepts being adopted as political ideology due to poor political awareness,
  - They should pressure government on services delivery and how public resources are being handled by the government,
  - There should advocate for common goals of the people but not at the basis of political interests and accommodations,
  - Political parties should provide political training to youths and women and oriented them on good leadership.

Conclusively, there are a lot of efforts needed to reforms political system and ideologies of current political parties which are operating in the country. The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and its peace partners should double their gear to reform and shape the political ideology and system of the governance in the country. But most importantly, the democracy should be adopted as a way of transferring power through fear political competition.
5.3 Recommendations of the study
The below recommendations were outlined by respondents as possible ways of shaping political parties to meet the expectations of the people;

- The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) should create an inclusive political resolution to put an end to political disputes in the country,
- The government stakeholders should be accountable in case if there is any misappropriation of public funds and this could be done without favor to limited excessive corruption in government institutions,
- Government should establish a comprehensive dialogue between opposition parties to reconcile burning issues which accelerate political instability in the country,
- The TGoNU should provide a ground to grass root members to express their concerns without fear and threat such that people should talk-out and resolve the misunderstanding among communities,
- The political parties should geared towards promoting democracy in the country,
- The political parties should act and operate under supreme constitution of the states,
- Political parties should create awareness on the importance of political organization in order to eradicate ethnicity concepts being adopted as political ideology due to poor political awareness,
- They should pressure government on services delivery and how public resources are being handled by the government,
- There should advocate for common goals of the people but not at the basis of political interests and accommodations,
- Political parties should provide political training to youths and women and oriented them on good leadership.
- Civil population should be aware on how parties operate to avoid misunderstanding among communities when there is political misunderstanding between leaders,
- Government should extend more efforts to control conflict eruptions and political instability in the country.
- Transparency and accountability should be prioritized in all governments’ institutions at different level of the governance.
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